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WHAT IS THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW IN THE WAR ON TERROR?
Robert J. Delahunty*
John C. Yoo**
INTRODUCTION
What role, if any, does international human rights law (IHRL) have
to play in situations of armed conflict? More specifically, does IHRL
have any application to the conduct of the "war on terror"?1 More
specifically still, does IHRL partly or wholly displace the traditional
law of armed conflict-as embodied, for instance, in the Hague and
Geneva Conventions-in regulating the armed conflict that arises in
the "war on terror"? We focus here on the last of these questions.
The predicate of that question is of course that the "war on ter-
ror"-meaning specifically, the conflict between the United States
and al Qaeda and its affiliates-is an armed conflict subject to the
Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which are the rules of international
law that regulate international armed conflicts.2 The assumption that
* Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
** Professor of Law, University of California Berkeley School of Law; Visiting Scholar,
American Enterprise Institute.
1. Although it appears that the leadership of the Obama Administration does not wish to
speak of the "war on terror," we shall use that term here and elsewhere. See Clinton: Adminis-
tration Has Stopped Using "War on Terror" Term, Fox NEWS, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.foxnews.
com/politics/firstlO0days/2009/03/30/clinton-administration-stopped-using-war-terror-term/ (last
visited Nov. 19, 2009). Regardless of the name that is preferred for it, an armed conflict between
the United States and al Qaeda and its affiliates continues to be fought now, as in the Bush
Administration, in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
2. For discussion of this assumption, compare, for example, PHILIP BOBBrrr, TERROR AND
CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 128-34 (2008) (arguing that "the
phrase 'a war on terror' is not an inapt metaphor, but rather a recognition of the way war is
changing"), JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TER-
ROR 1-17 (2006), Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the "War Against Terrorism,"
78 INT'L Ait. 301, 307-09, 314-16 (2002), and Daniel Statman, Targeted Killing, 5 THEORETICAL
INOUIRIES L. 179, 183-85 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol5/issl/art7/,
with ROBERT JERVIS, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A NEW ERA 46-51 (2005), Noah Feldman,
Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 458-66 (2002), and Monica
Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed
Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 369, 376-79 (2008). For a review of recent case
law and legal scholarship on the circumstances in which an "armed conflict" exists, see MARK
OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR 114-23, 130
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the "war on terror," so understood, is such a conflict-and is not, or
not only, a matter of domestic law enforcement-has been recognized
by Congress,3 the U.S. Supreme Court,4 the UN Security Council,5
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 6 Other courts
reviewing the legality of military actions in situations of terror that are
similar to the United States' conflict with al Qaeda have also con-
cluded that the LOAC-as distinct from domestic criminal law-pro-
vides the appropriate rules of decision.7 Yet the correct legal
categorization of the conflict with al Qaeda is not obvious. It is
plainly not a civil war or other "internal" armed conflict, such as the
conflicts to which Additional Protocol II paradigmatically applies.8 It
(2009). We use the term "law of armed conflict" (LOAC) in preference to the term "interna-
tional humanitarian law" (IHL), which was introduced by the International Committee of the
Red Cross in the early 1950s and has since largely supplanted the older term "law of war." See
Dieter Schindler, Significance of the Geneva Conventions for the Contemporary World, 81 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 715, 715 (1999). While "international humanitarian law" alludes, quite prop-
erly, to the humanitarian considerations reflected in the legal regime that the term designates, it
is apt to convey the belief that IHL is subsumed within, or derived from, international human
rights law. That, of course, is the very question at issue here. To avoid skewing the analysis from
the outset, therefore, we have used the still-common term "LOAC."
3. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
4. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594-95 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518
(2004).
5. S.C. Res. 1368, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept.
28, 2001) (recognizing and reaffirming "the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense"); see also Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to
the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/20011946
(Oct. 7, 2001) (explaining and defending the U.S. position); Christopher Greenwood, Interna-
tional Law and the Pre-Emptive Use of Force, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 17 (2003) (arguing that
international law recognizes that the concept of armed attacks is not limited to state actions, and
that al Qaeda's September 11 attacks on the U.S. triggered a right of lawful self-defense).
6. See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic
Council (Sept. 12, 2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm (last visited January 11,
2009).
7. See HCJ 769/02 Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel [2006], T 16-18,
21, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/d14f3f94989
b702fc12572d80043927b!OpenDocument; see also id. 2 (Rivlin, V.P., concurring); id. 7
(Beinisch, P., concurring). The Supreme Court of Israel rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
domestic Israeli criminal law should apply in the circumstances of the Second Intifada, and held
instead that the LOAC provided the appropriate rules for deciding on the legality of Israel's
"targeted assassinations" policy.
8. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [here-
inafter Protocol I]. Protocol II restricts its scope to conflicts in the territory of a state party
between its armed forces and "dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which,
under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." Id. art.
I(1) (emphasis added). It is well understood that the coverage of Protocol II does not extend to
all internal armed conflicts. See R.R. Baxter, Modernizing the Law of War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165,
169 (1977); Captain Daniel Smith, New Protections for Victims of International Armed Conflicts:
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is also not an "international" armed conflict in the sense of Common
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions,9 nor is it a "war of national
liberation" in the sense of Additional Protocol I.10 Nonetheless,
under the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, it is
an armed conflict "not of an international character" to which at least
some elements of the LOAC apply.11 We shall assume, then, that the
conflict is best described as a "transnational" one between a nation
state (the United States) and its allies, and a transnational terrorist
group and its non-state affiliates. 12 Our question can thus be framed
more precisely: what is the relationship between the LOAC and
IHRL with regard to a transnational armed conflict of this kind?
13
There are at least three reasons for narrowing the scope of the ques-
tion, rather than attempting to address, in anything like a comprehen-
sive fashion, the general topic of the relationship between the LOAC
The Proposed Ratification of Protocol II by the United States, 120 MIL. L. REV. 59, 66-69 (1988).
Customary international law relating to such "internal" armed conflicts is still evolving. The
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia gave a sig-
nificant impetus to the development of rules for such conflicts in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.
IT-94-I, Judgment (July 15, 1999). See Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law
and the Tadic Case, 7 EURO. J. IN'L L. 265 (1996). For a summary and appraisal of the Appeals
Chamber's rulings, see CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, International Humanitarian Law and the
Tadic Case, in ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 457, 472-74 (2006).
9. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.T.S. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
10. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1(4), June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
11. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
12. The conflict has many of the characteristics of what some scholars call "the new wars."
E.g., HERFRIED MONKLER, THE NEW WARS 10-16, 28 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2005); see also
Robert J. Delahunty, Is the Geneva POW Convention "Quaint"?, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1635, 1637-38 (2007); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Thinking About Presidents, 90 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1153, 1177-78 (2005) (reviewing PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: RATING THE BEST
AND THE WORST IN THE WHITE HOUSE (James Taranto & Leonard Leo eds., 2004)). See gener-
ally AZAR GAT, WAR IN HUMAN CIVILIZATION 637-57 (2006) (discussing the changing nature of
contemporary warfare); ARCHER JONES, THE ART OF WAR IN THE WESTERN WORLD 709-11
(1987) (analogizing contemporary terrorism to raiding strategies from earlier, "non-conven-
tional" armed conflicts in which low ratios of force to space prevailed, and suggesting that "con-
ventional" military campaigns will have significantly less effectiveness in the future than they
enjoyed during the Napoleonic wars or World War II).
13. We realize that our decision not to examine the question of the applicability of IHRL to
internal armed conflicts limits the scope of the present Article. In the post-1945 world, civil wars
have been the most deadly form of armed conflict. One study has estimated the 1945-1999
direct death toll for 127 civil wars at 16.2 million, or about five times the count for the 3.3 million
battle deaths in 25 international armed conflicts of that period. James D. Fearon & David D.
Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War, 97 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 75, 75 (2003). Another study
has found that of the 111 armed conflicts recorded for the period 1989-2000, only 7 were inter-
national. Peter Wallensteen & Margareta Sollenberg, Armed Conflict, 1989-2000, 38 J. PEACE
RES. 629, 632 tbl.II (2001).
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and IHRL. First, we shall be concerned here primarily with that part
of the LOAC that deals with jus in bello, the regulation of the conduct
of hostilities and belligerent occupations-or, as it is still often called,
"Hague/Geneva law" 14-rather than with the part that deals with jus
ad bellum, the decision to initiate or respond to hostilities.15 Likewise,
we do not attempt to deal here with the part of the LOAC-some-
times called jus post bellum-that deals with the place of IHRL in
belligerent occupations. 16 Second, the field of IHRL has simply be-
come too extensive to permit useful generalizations. For example,
some international human rights treaties, such as the Genocide Con-
vention, are plainly and uncontroversially applicable in situations of
armed conflict. 17 More debatably, human rights treaties such as the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) 18 have been held applicable to international
armed conflicts through judicial decision making.19 Third, some sig-
nificant provisions of the LOAC can themselves fairly be character-
ized as "human rights law." For example, Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, which has widely been understood to "regu-
late[] the relationship between governments and their own nationals
in the event of an internal armed conflict," could well be said to "con-
14. See, e.g., L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 30-36 (2d ed.
2000); JEAN PICTET, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 8-10 (1966).
15. On the distinction and overlap between contemporary jus ad bellum and jus in bello, see
Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 9 REV. INT'L
STUDIES 221 (1983). See also Yoram Dinstein, Comments on War, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
877 (2004).
16. For a survey of earlier views on that topic and an original analysis of the issue, see Adam
Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 589-95 (2006).
17. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. I, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (declaring that genocide "whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war" is an international crime).
18. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
19. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (Georg. v. Russ.), 2008 I.C.J. 4 (Oct. 15), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
docketlindex.php?pl=3&p2=3&code=GR&case=140&k=4d. A narrowly divided court held, by
an 8-7 vote, that it had jurisdiction over Georgia's complaint, which alleged that Russia had
engaged in violations of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) while providing military assistance to secessionist forces in South Os-
setia and Abkhazia. The court rejected Russia's arguments that (1) its dispute with Georgia
arose not under the CERD but under the LOAC, and (2) the ostensibly relevant provisions of
the CERD did not apply extraterritorially, meaning that the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
was without jurisdiction. Seven dissenting judges agreed with Russia; they would have held that
the Court did not have jurisdiction and that the case was properly controlled by the LOAC
rather than the CERD. See Cindy Galway Buys, Introductory Note to the International Court of
Justice's Order for Provisional Measures, in Georgia v. Russian Federation, 47 I.L.M. 1010,
1010-11 (2008).
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stitute[ ] a kind of human rights provision. ' 20 And Article 75 of Addi-
tional Protocol I, which sets forth certain fundamental guarantees for
enemy captives in the hands of a party to a conflict, is derived from
the landmark 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).21
To sharpen the discussion, therefore, we will concentrate on the ap-
plicability of the ICCPR to the conduct of hostilities in the "war on
terror." More narrowly still, we will consider the applicability of
ICCPR Article 6(1)-which guarantees that "[n]o one shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his life"-to combat operations in the "war on ter-
ror" by U.S. Armed Forces outside the United States.
One advantage of this specific focus is that it will enable us to ex-
amine, within the brief compass of this Article, the legality of the
United States' use of unmanned Predator drone missiles to kill sus-
pected al Qaeda targets, such as the incident involving the killing in
Yemen on November 3, 2002 of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi-reput-
20. Schindler, supra note 2, at 715, 717; see also Stefan Oeter, Civil War, Humanitarian Law
and the United Nations, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 195, 201-02 (1997) (asserting that Common
Article 3 embodies "a minimum standard that restricts the freedom of states to use force against
civil war opponents by guaranteeing a series of safeguards for wounded, prisoners and members
of the civilian population"); Smith, supra note 8, at 64-65 (arguing that Common Article 3 "pro-
vides some minimum protections for victims of internal armed conflicts, while avoiding any rec-
ognition of the rebel forces or any rebel entitlement to prisoner of war status.... It represented
the first internationally accepted law that regulated a state's treatment of its own nationals in
internal armed conflicts."); Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human
Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 25 (2004). To be sure, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan extended the application of Common Article 3 beyond "inter-
nal" armed conflicts to include transnational conflicts (and, indeed, to all non-international
armed conflicts) such as that with al Qaeda. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006).
Previously, however, the term "non-international armed conflicts" in Common Article 3 had
been interpreted specifically to mean "civil wars, internal disorders or political unrest." JEAN
PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICrIMs 53 (1975).
[T]he view that Common Article 3 "applies automatically to [non-international] armed
conflict is simply not accepted in practice," wrote one disinterested scholar some years
before the Hamdan litigation. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court saw fit to resolve
ambiguities over Common Article 3 by reference to Article 75 of the Geneva Addi-
tional Protocol II. However, America has not ratified this treaty, and though the
United States regards portions of Article 75 as reflective of customary law, this conces-
sion is not dispositive of the matter where evidence of state practice indicates other-
wise. In any event, the Additional Protocol confers its rights only contingently, upon a
display of some reciprocity by nonstate actors.
OSIEL, supra note 2, at 52-53; see also Robert J. Delahunty, supra note 12, at 1639-41 (marshal-
ling evidence supporting the traditional pre-Hamdan interpretation of Common Article 3);
Michael Schmitt, Rethinking the Geneva Conventions, in Crimes of War Project (Jan. 30, 2003)
(observing that the law of non-international armed conflict under Common Article 3 does not
neatly fit the conflict with al Qaeda), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/geneva
Conventions/gc-schmitt.html.
21. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
For an analysis of the derivation, see Roberts, supra note 16, at 591.
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edly a senior al Qaeda operative-while he was traveling with five
companions in a car.22 Citing the ICCPR, the UN Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions took the position
that the attack constituted a clear case of extrajudicial killing. The
United States, in reply, maintained that the ICCPR had no application
to the incident on the grounds that "[t]he conduct of a government in
legitimate military operations, whether against al Qaida operatives or
any other legitimate military target, would be governed by the inter-
national law of armed conflict," rather than by IHRL.23 The United
States' position was consistent with its longstanding view that during
armed conflict, "[a]ttacks on individual [military] officers have been
authorized and their legality has been accepted without significant
controversy. ' 24 The Bush Administration's practice was also consis-
tent with the policy of the United States well before the attacks of
9/11: on August 20, 1998, President Bill Clinton ordered Tomahawk
cruise missiles to attack al Qaeda training camps in Khost, Afghani-
stan, where intelligence information indicated that Osama bin Laden
and other senior al Qaeda leaders would be meeting. The Clinton
Administration justified the attacks as lawful self-defense under Arti-
cle 51 of the UN Charter. 25 Other Western nations, including Austra-
22. See David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Fatal Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out
by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at A16; James Risen & David Johnston, Bush Has Widened
Authority of C.IA. to Kill Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at 11; James Risen & Judith
Miller, C.LA. Is Reported to Kill a Leader of Qaeda in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at Al.
The use of unmanned drones by the United States to kill al Qaeda and Taliban suspects has
continued since that incident. U.S. drones were reported to have targeted and killed two al
Qaeda operatives, Rashid Rauf and Abu Zubair al-Masri, in northern Pakistan. See Zahid Hus-
sain & Matthew Rosenberg, Officials Say U.S. Strike Kills British Militant in Pakistan, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 24, 2008, at A14. Likewise, U.S. drone missiles are thought to have killed Pakistani
Taliban commander Haji Omar Khan in a raid in October 2008. See Pakistani Taliban "Com-
mander Killed", AL JAZEERA, Oct. 27, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 20460431.
23. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 1 611-12, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2004/7/Add.1 (Mar. 24, 2004). See generally NiLs MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (2008), reviewed in Michael N. Schmitt, Books Reviews, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 813
(2009).
24. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law:
Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 120 (1989). As former Judge
Sofaer went on to point out, "[A]mong the most famous of these [killings] was the deliberate
downing by the United States on April 18, 1943, of a Japanese military aircraft known to be
carrying Admiral Yamamoto." Id. at 120-21.
25. The missile strikes in Afghanistan were accompanied by simultaneous attacks on the al
Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, which was suspected of being a link in an al Qaeda nerve
gas manufacturing plant. The Clinton Administration argued that the attacks were justifiable as
lawful self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, thus implicitly assuming the applicability
of a "war" paradigm to the conflict with al Qaeda. Indeed, then-National Security Adviser
Sandy Berger described the attack in Afghanistan as directed against "a military target," and
anonymous Administration sources stated that the attack was designed to kill Osama bin Laden
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lia, have engaged in targeted killings of suspected Taliban leaders and
have also defended the practice as lawful.26 Indeed, "[m]ost states de-
cline to condemn the successful targeting of terrorist leaders, thereby
indicating their view that the practice is permissible. Even Human
Rights Watch declined to condemn the 2002 U.S. killing of an Al
Qaeda leader and his associates in Yemen."'27
The Obama Administration has continued the practice of using mis-
siles to target and kill suspected al Qaeda and Taliban figures.28 Presi-
dent Obama's Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, testified in January
2009 before the Senate Armed Services Committee that "both Presi-
dent Bush and President Obama have made clear that we will go after
al Qaeda wherever al Qaeda is. And we will continue to pursue this
[policy]."'29 It is reported that unmanned drones have become among
the U.S. military's favorite weapons in the conflicts in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan-including for use in targeting suspected terrorist com-
pounds-and the Obama Administration is said to be preparing a
and as many of his associates as possible. Several states expressed support, or at least under-
standing, for the attacks, including Australia, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, and the U.K. See
Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 161, 163 (1999). For legal analyses close in time to the events, see W. Michael
Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 47-49 (1999); Ruth
Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559
(1999).
26. See ADF's Taliban Assassinations Revealed, AUSTL. BROADCASTING COMPANY NEWS,
Nov. 27, 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/11/27/2431153.htm (last visited Nov. 19,
2009).
This body of international law is not pacifist law. It does allow killing of enemy com-
batants and civilians who take a direct part in hostilities .... Just as it's also legal for
the Taliban to hunt down an Australian SAS person or anybody on the Australian side,
or any of the allied sides.
Id. (quoting Tim McCormack, Professor of Humanitarian Law at Melbourne University); see
also Emma Rogers, Aust Forces Killed "High-Ranking" Taliban Commander, AUSTL. BROAD-
CASTING COMPANY NEWS, Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/12/11/2443
966.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) ("On at least one occasion we have been accused of assassi-
nations-I reject this vehemently .... What we do is lawful in war, it is conducted in a moral,
ethical and legal framework and our actions are always subject to constant review." (quoting
Major-General McOwan, Australian commander of Special Operations Task Group)).
27. OSIEL, supra note 2, at 55.
28. See Chris Brummitt, Suspected US Missile Strike Kills 18 in Pakistan, ABC NEWS, Jan. 23,
2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/printid=6714183; Zahid Hussain & Matthew Rosen-
berg, Missile Strike Kills Taliban Militants in Pakistan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at A8; R.
Jeffrey Smith, Candace Rondeaux & Joby Warrick, 2 U.S. Airstrikes Offer a Concrete Sign of
Obama's Pakistan Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, at Al; Nahal Toosi, Suspected US Missiles
Kill 7 in Northwest Pakistan, ABC NEWS, Mar. 1, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6983224.
29. Gates Says Missile Attacks in Pakistan Will Continue, CNN, Jan. 28, 2009, http://edition.
cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/27/gates.pakistan.afghanistan/.
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budgetary request for the development of new drone systems. 30 In-
deed, as the strategic analyst Andrew Bacevich has written, unmanned
drone missiles have become President Obama's "weapon of choice for
an expanded Israeli-style program of targeted assassination in Paki-
stan. ' 31 And as of late 2009, the Obama Administration had used
drone strikes more frequently than the Bush Administration-a mat-
ter on which the Obama Administration prided itself.32 We therefore
think it is illuminating to consider the relationship of IHRL to the
"war on terror" in the specific context of cases such as this.33
In Part II, we survey the origins and growth of the LOAC and
IHRL, and we discuss the beginnings of their asserted "conver-
gence."' 34 In Part III.A, we restate and defend the traditional view
that the LOAC and IHRL fundamentally differ in their scope, pur-
poses, and protective concerns. 35 Then, in Part III.B, we argue that
the ICCPR, in particular, was not intended, and should not be under-
stood, to regulate the conduct of armed conflicts that are otherwise
governed by the LOAC.36 In Part III.C, we address certain objections
that have been raised against this construction of the ICCPR.37 Fi-
nally, in Part IV, we apply the results we have reached to the contro-
versy over the incident involving Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi. 38
30. See Christopher Drew, Despite Shortcomings, Drones Now Among Military's Favorite
Weapons, STAR-TRIB., Mar. 17, 2009, at A9.
31. Andrew J. Bacevich, Op-Ed, Obama's Sins of Omission, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 2009.
32. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.'s Covert Drone Pro-
gram?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa-
fact mayer#ixzz0fiFqU5zy.
According to a just completed study by the New America Foundation, the number of
drone strikes has risen dramatically since Obama became President. During his first
nine and a half months in office, he has authorized as many C.I.A. aerial attacks in
Pakistan as George W. Bush did in his final three years in office. The study's authors,
Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, report that the Obama Administration has
sanctioned at least forty-one C.I.A. missile strikes in Pakistan since taking office-a
rate of approximately one bombing a week. So far this year, various estimates suggest,
the C.I.A. attacks have killed between three hundred and twenty-six and five hundred
and thirty-eight people. Critics say that many of the victims have been innocent by-
standers, including children.
33. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 48-69 (analyzing the legality of this incident).
34. See infra notes 39-86 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 102-142 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 143-166 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 167-171 and accompanying text.
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II. A SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The basic relationships between the LOAC and IHRL, though
much studied, remain unsettled.39 Whether, as is sometimes asserted,
39. See GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 68-79 (1994); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 25-29 (2004); OSIEL, supra
note 2, at 111-48; CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HUMAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM
241-66 (2003); George H. Aldrich et al., Human Rights and Armed Conflict: Conflicting Views,
67 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 141 (1973); Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster & William Abresch,
The Competence of the UN Human Rights Council and Its Special Procedures in Relation to
Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the "War on Terror", 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183 (2008);
Kenneth Anderson, U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and Superpower Compliance with International
Human Rights Norms, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 455 (2007); R.R. Baxter, Modernizing the Law of
War, 78 MIL. L. REV. 165 (1977); Thomas Buergenthal, The Normative and Institutional Evolu-
tion of International Human Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 703 (1997); Thomas Buergenthal, To Re-
spect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72 (Louis R. Henkin ed., 1981);
Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed
Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (2005); Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain
Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 1993 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 94;
Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does International Humanitarian
Law Provide All the Answers?, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 881 (2006); G.I.A.D. Draper, Humani-
tarian Law and Human Rights, 1979 ACTA JURIDICA 193, 199; G.I.A.D. Draper, The Relation-
ship Between the Human Rights Regime and the Law of Armed Conflicts, 1 ISRAELI Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 191 (1971); Asbjorn Eide, The Laws of War and Human Rights-Differences and Conver-
gences, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS
PRINCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 675 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984); Gerhard von
Glahn, The Protection of Human Rights in Time of Armed Conflicts, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS.
208 (1971); Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection
and International Humanitarian Law, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 789 (2004); Robert Kolb, The
Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1998 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 409; Heike Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanita-
rian Law and Human Rights Law in the ICRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECUR-
ITY L. 265 (2006); Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict,
87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 737 (2005); Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Trea-
ties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1995); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 239 (2000); H. Meyrowitz, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Droits de I'Homme, 88
REVUE Du DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'tTRANGER 1059
(1972); Daniel O'Donnell, Trends in the Application of International Humanitarian Law by
United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms, 1998 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 481; R. Quentin-Bax-
ter, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law-Confluence or Conflict?, 9 AUST. Y.B. INT'L L. 94
(1985); Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Con-
flicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11 (1995); Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupa-
tion: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580 (2006); A.H.
Robertson, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOR OF JEAN PICTET 793 (Christophe
Swinarski ed., 1984); Dietrich Schindler et al., Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrela-
tionship of the Laws, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 935 (1982); Dietrich Schindler, The International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross and Human Rights, 1979 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 3; Sabine von
Schorlemer, Human Rights: Substantive and Institutional Implications of the War Against Terror-
ism, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 265 (2003); Waldemar A. Solf, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Some
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they are rooted in a common principle of respect for humanity,40 the
two bodies of law grew up independently, and only in recent decades
have they been seen as "converging." The traditional view of their
relationship was succinctly described by Jean Pictet, the eminent legal
expert for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
when he stated that the LOAC "is valid only in the case of armed
conflict while human rights are essentially applicable in peacetime. '41
Likewise, the British legal scholar Christopher Greenwood has ex-
plained that traditionally
[h]uman rights law is designed to operate primarily in normal
peacetime conditions, and within the framework of the legal rela-
tionship between a state and its citizens. The [LOAC], by contrast,
is chiefly concerned with the abnormal conditions of armed conflict
and the relationship between a state and the citizens of its adver-
sary, a relationship otherwise based upon power rather than law. 42
According to the great Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, the rules of
war have ultimately stemmed from war's "agonistic or ludic" quality:
in contrast to "the very earliest phases of culture," in which violence
expressed itself "in predatory expeditions, assassinations, man-hunts,
Observations on the Relationship of Human Rights Law to the Law of Armed Conflict, in WORLD
IN TRANSITION: CHALLENGES TO HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENTS AND WORLD ORDER 41
(Henry Hyunwook Han ed., 1979); Federico Sperotto, Targeted Killings in Response to Security
Threats: Warfare and Humanitarian Issues, 8 GLOBAL JURIST art. 10 (2008); Dale Stephens,
Human Rights and Armed Conflict-The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2001); Ratil Emilio Vinuesa,
Interface, Correspondence and Convergence of Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law, 1 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 69 (1998); Watkin, supra note 20; U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working
Paper on the Relationship Between Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14 (June 21, 2005) (prepared by Fancoise Hampson & Ibrahim
Salama); Steven Haines et al., Human Rights: Their Place on the Battlefield, in THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (2005), available at http://www.
chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3252-ilparmedconflict.pdf; Yuval Shany, Human Rights and Humani-
tarian Law As Competing Legal Paradigms for Fighting Terror (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem
Faculty of Law, Research Paper No. 23-09, Nov. 2009), http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1504106.
40. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 183 (Dec. 10, 1998), 38
I.L.M. 317 (1999); Theodore Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
239, 245 (2000) ("The fact that the law of war and human rights law stem from different histori-
cal and doctrinal roots has not prevented the principle of humanity from becoming the common
denominator of both systems."); OSIEL, supra note 2, at 127-28 (criticizing the claim that both
LOAC and IHRL are rooted in a common idea of human dignity).
41. PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 15 (1975); see also
PICTET, supra note 14, at 12 ("In fact, Human Rights represent the most generous principles in
humanitarian law, whose laws of war are only one particular and exceptional case, which appears
precisely at times when war restricts or harms the exercising of human rights.").
42. Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 1, 12 (Dieter Fleck 2d ed. 2008).
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head-hunting" and the like, Huizinga contends that the "idea of war-
fare" arose only when "a special condition of general hostility sol-
emnly proclaimed is recognized as distinct from individual quarrels
and family feuds."'43 In archaic society, this idea elevated mere vio-
lence "to the level of holy causes ... ; it now forms part of that com-
plex of ideas comprising justice, fate, and honour. ' 44 Huizinga finds
that "rules" limit the nature and degree of violence even among small
boys and young dogs at play.45 Not remarkably, therefore, such rules
are to be found throughout human history and in a great variety of
places and circumstances. The LOAC is in its origins a centuries-old
body of law, 46 evidence of which can be identified in the ancient
world,47 including the societies of Israel, 48 Greece,49 Rome,50 China,
51
43. J. HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN CULTURE 95 (1950).
44. Id. at 95.
45. Id. at 1, 89.
46. See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 478-82 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE CULTURE OF WAR
129-49 (2008) (surveying rules of war in different periods and societies); Christopher Green-
wood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
ARMED CONFLICTS 1, 12-23 (Dieter Fleck ed. 1995) (summarizing the history of jus in bello).
47. For a survey of the law of war in the ancient Mediterranean civilizations of Israel, Greece,
and Rome, see DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 242-49 (2001). A
more skeptical approach is found in ARTHUR M. ECKSTEIN, MEDITERRANEAN ANARCHY, IN-
TERSTATE WAR, AND THE RISE OF ROME 37-42, 79-80 (2009).
48. See Deuteronomy 20:19-20; 2 Kings 6:22-23; see also GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE SPIRIT OF
JEWISH LAW 149-52 (1953) (discussing Biblical jus in bello as rabbinically elaborated); Rabbi
Michael J. Broyde, Battlefield Ethics in the Jewish Tradition, 95 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 92
(2002); Major Guy B. Roberts, Judaic Sources of and Views on the Laws of War, 37 NAVAL L.
REV. 221, 230-33 (1988). See generally 2 WALTHER EICHRODT, THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTA-
MENT 336 (J.A. Baker trans., 1967) (arguing that Israelite laws of war mark "a weakening of the
tendency to ascribe autonomous validity to the political sphere"). For the modern Ethical Code
of Israeli Defense Forces, see http:/www.jewishvirtuallibrary.orgljsource/Society_&-Culture/
IDF_ethics.html.
49. See RICHARD NED LEBOW, THE TRAGIC VISION OF POLITICS: ETHICS, INTERESTS AND
ORDERS 164 (2003) (summarizing Thucydides' account of common Greek customs of war); J.E.
LENDON, SOLDIERS & GHOSTS: A HISTORY OF BATTLE IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 41-57 (2005)
(analyzing the conventions of hoplite warfare); Adriaan Lanni, The Laws of War in Ancient
Greece (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper, Paper No. 07-24, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1069874. In The Republic, Plato's Socrates, when addressing
the question "How shall our soldiers treat their enemies?", lays down certain laws of war appli-
cable to conflicts between Greek city-states: that Greeks not enslave each others' cities or citi-
zens; that they not despoil enemy dead, except of armor; that spoils not be offered at temples;
and that enemy territory and houses not be devasted. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 165-68
(Benjamin Jowett trans., 3d ed. 1888). Socrates makes clear that these rules apply to conflict
between Greeks and other Greeks, which he considers a kind of "civil war," but not (at least in
full force) to war with "barbarians," which he takes to be "war" in the proper sense. In warring
against non-Greeks, Socrates says, Greeks may treat their enemies as they treat other Greeks in
actual practice. See id.
50. See ALAN WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARCHAIC ROME: WAR AND RELIGION 50-52
(1993) (noting that different legal rules were applied to the treatment of a conquered people or
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and India, 52 as well as in classical Islam 53 and in medieval Christian
Europe.5 4 Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, jus
in bello came to be codified in such landmark instruments as the 1863
Lieber Code (which was used by the Union Army in the American
Civil War 55 and which is regarded as the origin of "Hague Law"), the
1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
city depending on whether it surrendered "in trust" ["in fidem"] or "into the dominion" ["in
dicionem"]). The great Roman orator and politician Cicero expounded certain rules of war in
his De Officiis (Of Moral Duties). See generally THOMAS L. PANGLE & PETER J. AHRENSDORF,
JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: ON THE MORAL BASIS OF POWER AND PEACE 66-70 (1999). Of
relevance here, Cicero distinguishes between lawful and unlawful combatants:
Popilius, as commander, held control of a province. A son of Cato served his first
campaign in his army. When Popilius saw fit to discharge one of the legions, he dis-
charged also Cato's son, who served in that same legion. But when the youth remained
in the army for love of military service, Cato wrote to Popilius that if he permitted his
son to stay, he must make him take a second oath of military duty, else, the term of the
first oath having expired, he could not lawfully fight with the enemy .... There is,
indeed, extant a letter of Marcus Cato the elder to his son Marcus, in which he writes
that he has heard of his son's discharge by the consul, after service in Macedonia in the
war with Perseus, and warns him not to go into battle, inasmuch as it is not right for one
who is no longer a soldier to fight with the enemy.
1 ETHICAL WRITINGS OF CICERO 24 (Andrew Peabody trans., 1887); see also id. 385 (asserting
that pirates are not belligerents but "common foe of all").
51. See Huizinga, supra note 43, at 97.
52. See Nagendra Singh, Armed Conflicts and Humanitarian Laws of Ancient India, in Swinar-
ski, supra note 39, at 532; see also JOHN FERGUSON, WAR AND PEACE IN THE WORLD'S RELI-
GIONS 30-31 (1977); K.N. Upadhyaya, The Bhagavad Gitd on War and Peace, 19 PHIL. E. & W.
159 (1969).
53. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 2
(May 24) (Tarazi, J., dissenting); Sohail H. Hashmi, Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and
Peace, in ISLAMIC POLITICAL ETHICS: CIVIL SOCIETY, PLURALISM AND CONFLICT 194 (Sohail H.
Hashmi ed., 2002); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, THE HOLY WAR IDEA IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC
TRADITIONS 115-27 (1997); JOHN KELSAY, ISLAM AND WAR: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ETH-
ics 57-76 (1993); MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 102 (1955) (quot-
ing the instructions of Abu Bakr on the first Syrian expedition); RUDOLPH PETERS, JIHAD IN
CLASSICAL AND MODERN ISLAM 9-17 (1996) (collecting ahddith [sayings of the prophet Muham-
mad]); Ella Landau-Tasseron, "Non-Combatants" in Muslim Legal Thought (Hudson Institute,
Paper No. 3, Dec. 2006), http://www.currenttrends.org/docLib/20061226-NoncombatantsFinal.
pdf.
54. See PHILIPPE CONTAMINE, WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 260-302 (Michael Jones trans.,
1984); L. C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 23-25 (2d ed. 2000); JOHN-
SON, supra note 53, at 102-12; RICHARD W. KAEUPER, CHIVALRY AND VIOLENCE IN MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 169-85 (1999) (discussing the differing implications of ideals of chivalry for knights and
for non-combatants); RICHARD NED LEBOW, A CULTURAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 257 (2008); THEODORE MERON, Medieval and Renaissance Ordinances of War: Codifying
Discipline and Humanity, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 1, 1-10 (1998); PANGLE &
AHRENSDORF, supra note 50, at 73-88.
55. See General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code], reprinted in 2 FRANCES LIEBER,
CONTRIBUTIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 245, 247-74 (1881), available at http://www.icrc.org/
ihl.nsfIFULL/110?OpenDocument.
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Wounded in Armies in the Field56 (from which later "Geneva Law"
derives), and the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg57 (which first in-
troduced restrictions on the use of certain types of weapons in war).
The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 issued important conven-
tions that regulate the conduct of warfare and the use of weaponry,
including the 1907 Convention (IV) with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land.58 The four Geneva Conventions of 194959
(replacing the two Geneva Conventions of 1929)60 introduced new
and more extensive protections for the victims of armed conflicts, in-
cluding especially non-combatants in enemy or occupied territory.
Owing largely to the demands of Third World and Communist bloc
nations, 61 the 1949 Conventions were significantly modified by two
"Additional Protocols" in 1977.62 The LOAC continues to undergo
active development, as for instance in the draft convention regulating
the use of cluster bombs, to which 110 nations agreed in May 2008.63
56. Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361. As Pictet notes, this convention marks
the point at which the rules of jus in bello began to become multilateral. See PICrET, supra note
14, at 10-11.
57. See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
FULL/130?OpenDocument.
58. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and in Its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/1d1726425f6955aec
125641e0038bfd6.
59. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [herein-
after Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva IV].
60. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47
Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 118 L.N.T.S. 303.
61. See Antonio Cassese, Wars of National Liberation and Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES
AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOR
OF JEAN PICTET, supra note 39, at 313.
62. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol
I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol
IIl.
63. See Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, available at http://www.cluster
convention.org/downloadablefiles/ccm77_english.pdf.
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IHRL also has a long and distinguished pedigree, 64 although in an
internationalized form it can be said to have originated as recently as
the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Universal Declara-
tion).65 The Universal Declaration provided "for the first time a com-
mon comprehensive international standard" of human rights. 66 The
drafting history of the Universal Declaration shows that the delegates
understood that the Declaration would apply only in time of peace. 67
For the first two decades of the post-war period, IHRL had little or no
discernible relationship to the LOAC, in part because United Nations
bodies believed that by promoting the development of the LOAC,
they would undermine hopes for a peaceful, Charter-governed world,
and in part because the ICRC wished to preserve its independence. 68
64. See, e.g., MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES
TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 18-27 (2004) (surveying ancient sources); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE
REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVIN-
ISM 23-37 (2007) (providing a "thumbnail sketch" of the main western sources of IHRL, with an
emphasis on the Calvinist tradition). Scholarly opinions on the question of the "foundations" of
contemporary human rights doctrine in the early modern period are surveyed in Victoria Kahn,
Early Modern Rights Talk, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 391 (2001).
65. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. For a discussion on the drafting and adoption of the
Universal Declaration, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001).
66. Gerard Cohen Jonathan, Human Rights Covenants, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 915, 915 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995).
67. See Kolb, supra note 39, at 412 (quoting the statement of Jimfnez de Arfchaga that
human rights "govern, in time of peace, an international community based on the principles of
the United Nations"). Kolb finds that
[t]he absence of any discussion of the problem of war can be explained by the general
philosophy which prevailed within the United Nations at the time. There seemed to be
a tacit but nevertheless general consensus that the Declaration was intended for times
of peace, of which the United Nations was the guarantor.
Id. at 412-13.
Parce que les auteurs de la Ddclaration ont considfrd le respect des droits de l'homme
A l'intfrieur de chaque ttat comme une condition capitale de la sauvegarde de la paix,
c'est dans le seul cadre de la paix qu'ils ont envisage ces droits and qu'ils se sont at-
tachfs A les dffinir .... [Tioutes ces dispositions, qu'il faut compter parmi les clauses
principales de la Declaration ... sont radicalement inapplicable aux rapports ennemis.
Ces formules montrent que l'object essential de la Declaration ... est de promouvoir
l'6tablissement d'un droit constitutionnelle minimum uniforme .... [Because the au-
thors of the Declaration considered the importance of human rights in each state as an
essential condition to safeguarding peace, it was within the framework of peace that
they envisioned these rights and that they defined these rights .... All of these provi-
sions, that one must count among the most central in the Declaration . . . are com-
pletely inapplicable to enemy relations. These expressions show that the essential goal
of the Declaration is to promote a minimally uniform constitutional law.]
MEYRowrrz, supra note 39, at 1082-83 (author's translation).
68. See Kolb, supra note 39, at 410-11; Schindler, supra note 2, at 717.
816
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It was understood from the early stages of the drafting of the Uni-
versal Declaration that it would not be self-executing, but rather
would be implemented by a later treaty (or, as it turned out, a pair of
treaties).69 These implementing treaties-the 1966 ICCPR and its
companion, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)70-were nearly two decades in the making,
and they entered into force only in 1976.71 Not long after these two
Covenants were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966,72
parts of the international community sought to introduce the norms
propounded in these IHRL documents into the LOAC. This pro-
cess-which Professor Theodor Meron has styled the "humanization"
of the LOAC 3-seems to have begun with the UN International Con-
ference on Human Rights in 1968 in Teheran.74 In a series of periodi-
cal resolutions dating from the same period, the UN General
Assembly began to thread together the humanitarian requirements of
the LOAC and the doctrines of IHRL.75 The original "humanization"
project may have reflected the belief that the then-nascent ICCPR
69. See GLENDON, supra note 65, at 121, 139; see also 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 751 (1948) (as-
serting that the Declaration "is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal
obligation").
The travaux priparatoires [preparatory work] make it clear that the overwhelming ma-
jority of the speakers in the various organs of the United Nations did not intend the
Declaration to become a statement of law or of legal obligations, but a statement of
principles devoid of any obligatory character, and which would have moral force
"only."
Egon Schwelb, The Influence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on International and
National Law, 1959 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 217, 218; see also Frede Castberg, Natural Law and
Human Rights: An Idea-Historical Survey, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
13, 31 (Asbjorn Eide & August Schou eds., 1968) (stating that the Universal Declaration "is not
a binding agreement of international law but a proclamation of morally binding norms"). In-
deed, the Preamble to the Declaration makes its non-binding character clear: "[E]very individual
and every organ of society . . . shall strive . . . to promote respect for these rights and free-
doms .. " Universal Declaration, supra note 65 (emphasis added).
70. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
71. On the preparation of the ICCPR, see Vratislav Pechota, The Development of the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra note 39, at 32; Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of the Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights of December 1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 69, at 103, 104-06.
72. See ICESCR, supra note 70; ICCPR, supra note 70.
73. Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, supra note 39, at 239.
74. See International Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 22-May. 13, 1968, Proclamation of
Teheran, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (Apr. 13, 1968), reprinted in U.N. Pub. No. E.68.XIV.2
(1968); see also Kolb, supra note 39, at 419; Meyrowitz, supra note 39, at 1061-69.
75. See, e.g., Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), U.N.
Doc. AJRES/2444 (XXIII) (Dec. 9, 1968); G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), sec. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2675
(XXV) (Dec. 9, 1970) ("Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid
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and ICESCR might be invoked to ameliorate armed conflicts such as
the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war or the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war.
Equally, it may have stemmed from the desire of some of its propo-
nents to constrain or embarrass militarily powerful nations such as the
United States, then at war in Vietnam, 76 or Israel, whose regional
dominance had just been demonstrated by its decisive victory in the
1967 Six-Day War.77
Whatever the original sources of the "convergence" of LOAC and
IHRL, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC)-
the organ originally charged with monitoring compliance with the
ICCPR-was extraordinarily aggressive in seeking to alter the
LOAC.78 In 1982, the UNHRC had the "supreme duty to prevent
wars," and it termed measures to avert nuclear war in particular to be
down in international instruments, continue to apply fully [sic] in situations of armed conflict.").
According to Frits Kalshoven, Resolution 2444 gave
the starting shot ... for an accelerated movement which brought the three currents:
Geneva, The Hague and New York, together in one main stream. Governments, the
United Nations Organization and the ICRC participated in it, and the debate con-
cerned the rules of combat in the sense of The Hague and the protection of the victims
of war in the sense of Geneva, as much as the promotion of the idea of international
protection of human rights in armed conflicts.
FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 22-23 (1987).
76. As Kalshoven notes, Resolution 2444 was adopted "precisely in the year that the Ameri-
can bombardments of North Vietnam commenced." KALSHOVEN, supra note 75, at 22.
77. See Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, supra note 39, at 194-95.
[T]he resolution[ ] adopted at Teheran purporting to weld human rights with the hu-
manitarian law of armed conflict . . . was politically charged and primarily directed
against the Israeli "occupation" of "Arab lands".... In the period between 1968 and
1971 we witness in the organs of the UN a mounting endeavour to effect a fusion of the
humanitarian law of war with human rights, which is not the outcome of accident. This
movement . .. reflects the political currents flowing through the UN in those years.
The junction of human rights and the humanitarian law of war was.., profitable to the
* Arab states in their perennial confrontation with Israel ....
Id.
78. The UNHRC was succeeded in 2006 by the United Nations Human Rights Council. See
G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/25 (Mar. 15, 2006). See generally LAW AND PRACTICE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 461-69 (Simon Chesterman, Thomas M. Franck & David M. Malone eds.,
2008); JAMES TRAUB, THE BEST INTENTIONS: KOFI ANNAN AND THE UN IN THE ERA OF AMERI-
CAN WORLD POWER 413-14 (2006). The work of both the UNHRC and its successor, the
Human Rights Council, has been severely criticized by commentators of various persuasions,
including then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who declared that the performance of the
UNHRC "cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole." Warren
Hoge, Dismay over New Human Rights Council, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 11, 2007, at 1.18. Like-
wise, a UN High-Level Panel reported that
[i]n recent years, the [Human Rights] Commission's capacity to perform [its] tasks has
been undermined by eroding credibility and professionalism. Standard-setting to rein-
force human rights cannot be performed by States that lack a demonstrated commit-
ment to their promotion and protection. We are concerned that in recent years States
have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to
protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others.
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the "most important condition and guarantee for the safeguarding of
the right to life" that is protected by ICCPR Article 6(1). 79 The lead-
ing commentator on the ICCPR has noted that this position entails
that any killing in a war not permissible under the UN Charter is a
U.N. Doc. A/59/565, 283 (Dec. 1, 2004). Others also argued that the UNHRC "routinely fell
victim to gross human rights violators who gained a position on the body and devoted them-
selves to quashing resolutions criticizing anyone among their number." James Traub, Ban Ki-
Moon vs. the Bad Guys, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 5, 2006, at 6.17. Dissatisfaction with the
UNHRC eventually led to demands for major reforms. Secretary General Annan proposed an
overhaul of the UNHRC in 2005. His proposal included a requirement that an applicant for
membership on the new Human Rights Council receive two-thirds support from UN member
states in order to serve on that body. But Annan's idea was rejected. Thus, the new Human
Rights Council continues to include many states with poor human rights records, and it has again
been selective in its monitoring activities. See Warren Hoge, New Human Rights Council Brings
Limited Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A6; see also Ken Levine & Robert Leikind,
Keeping the Commitment to Dignity for All, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2008, at A15.
The UN Human Rights Council . . .- a body that includes some of the world's most
repressive regimes, including Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan-has dedicated itself to
the vilification of Israel. In the last two years, it has passed 22 resolutions condemning
Israel, four criticizing Burma, and one directed at North Korea. In the same period, it
has not passed a single resolution calling attention to human rights abuses in
Zimbabwe, Iran, Tibet, the Congo, or Saudi Arabia, or to concerns in any of the 184
UN member states.
Id. Despite its short existence, disappointment with the Human Rights Council is already wide-
spread. Vaclev Havel-the former Czech President, playwright, and human rights activist-re-
cently derided the Council as "a farce." See Vaclev Havel, Op-Ed., A Table for Tyrants, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2009, at A23. The New York Times has editorialized that the Council "ha[s]
already fallen into the shameful pattern." In contrast, "[t]he old, unreformed United Nations
Human Rights Commission was selective and one-sided, but occasionally managed to do some
good work." Editorial, A Discredit to the United Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A28.
U.S. Under-Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns flatly stated that "[tihe Human Rights Council
is a discredited institution. All it has done is to bash Israel; it has ignored North Korea, it has
ignored Sudan and it has ignored Burma." Warren Hoge, U.S. Rebuke to Myanmar Is Defeated
by U.N. Vetoes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at A6. Likewise, Kenneth Roth, the Executive Direc-
tor of Human Rights Watch, has said that the Council has been "enormously disappointing, and
the opponents of human rights enforcement are running circles around the proponents." Hoge,
Dismay over New Human Rights Council, supra. The Human Rights Council is not without its
defenders. For example, when the international law scholar Richard Falk was asked whether
"the Human Rights Council [has] established itself as an organization that investigates human
rights abuses in a broad range of conflict zones, or is there some truth to the assertion that it
singles out Israel?," he replied,
There is no doubt that any political institution will establish priorities based on the
concerns of its membership. From this perspective it's not surprising that a focus
should be placed on Israel and the Palestinian plight .... Limitation[ ] of resources,
geopolitical pressures and blind spots help explain why some other situations involving
serious human rights abuse are not addressed with comparable seriousness.
Linda Mamoun, A Conversation with Richard Falk, NATION, June 17, 2008. For a devastating
critique of the Council, see Kenneth Anderson, The Past, Present, and Future of the United Na-
tions: A Comment on Paul Kennedy and the Parliament of Man (Wash. Coll. of Law Research
Paper No. 2008-70, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265833.
79. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm'n., General Comment 6, § 2 (July 27, 1982), reprinted in U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (May 12, 2003).
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violation of Article 6(1) 80-a conclusion plainly in tension with the
pre-Charter LOAC developed at the Nuremberg Trials. 81 Further, in
1984, the UNHRC opined that the "designing, testing, manufacturing,
possession and deployment of nuclear weapons are among the great-
est threats to life which confront mankind," and therefore, "[t]he pro-
duction, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons
should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against humanity." 82
Under such interpretations as these, the ICCPR would subsume the
law of weaponry-traditionally and currently a core element of the
LOAC, which is hammered out in difficult and protracted negotiations
among states, their militaries, and non-governmental organizations.
Setting apart the question of the truth of the UNHRC's assertions
regarding nuclear weapons (there is considerable debate whether nu-
clear arsenals have tended to reduce the incidence of major war),83 it
is a far cry from the ICCPR's original purposes to treat it as though it
is authorized to regulate nuclear weaponry. Were that so, important
international instruments-such as the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 84
or the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 85-
would seem to have been pointless. 86
80. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COM-
MENTARY 124-25 (1993).
81. See United States v. Wilhelm List, in 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
Case No. 47 (1949); How DoEs LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 679, 681-82 (Marco Sass6li & Antoine
A. Bouvier eds., 1999) (arguing that even assuming that German armed forces were waging an
illegal war of aggression in World War II, "it does not follow that every act by the German
occupation forces against person or property is a crime or that any and every act undertaken by
the population of the occupied country against the German occupation thereby became legiti-
mate defense").
82. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm'n., General Comment 14, §§ 4, 6 (Nov. 2, 1984), reprinted in U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (May 12, 2003).
83. See, e.g., ScoTT D. SAGAN & KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
A DEBATE RENEWED (2002).
84. Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
85. Mar. 5, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
86. In general, even in a period that has seen persistent efforts to pull the LOAC into the
gravitational orbit of 1HRL, states have continuously provided for the regulation of weaponry by
discrete LOAC treaties, such as by two protocols (1995 and 1996) to the 1980 Weapons Conven-
tion, a 1995 protocol on blinding laser weapons, a 1996 treaty amendment on land mines, and the
very recent 2008 agreement on cluster bombs. See Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 13, 1995, 2024 U.N.T.S. 163; Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended May 3, 1996,
2048 U.N.T.S. 133. In these circumstances, the UNHRC's assumption that weaponry is regu-
lated by the ICCPR is plainly belied by ongoing state practice.
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III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, AND THE ICCPR IN
PARTICULAR, DOES NOT REGULATE ARMED CONFLICTS THAT
ARE OTHERWISE GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
A. The Fundamental Differences Between the Law of Armed
Conflict and International Human Rights Law
Contrary to the views of the UNHRC, there are powerful reasons
to conclude that while the ICCPR does indeed regulate a state party's
dealings with its own nationals-and others subject to its jurisdiction,
such as aliens on its territory-it does not apply to the relations be-
tween a state party and the nationals of a state with which the former
is engaged in armed conflict. This conclusion is hardly surprising in
light of the fact that the ICCPR was designed to implement the Uni-
versal Declaration which, as discussed above, was intended to apply in
peacetime.
We start from the once-universal view that human rights treaties are
primarily addressed to protecting a state's own nationals (and others,
like resident aliens, in its territory and under its jurisdiction) from that
state, rather than to protecting the nationals of a state with which it is
or has been at war.8 7 The underlying conceptions of the state in the
two bodies of law fundamentally differ.88 In IHRL, the state exists
principally to further the objectives and well-being of those who are
subject to it; consequently, it is an object of suspicion insofar as it may
exalt its own purposes over those of the individuals who it governs.
By contrast, the LOAC characteristically imposes few or no duties on
a state with respect to its own subjects (whom it is protecting from a
foreign threat); rather, the state is an object of suspicion only because
of the unnecessary harms that it may inflict on others, most especially
the subjects of its enemies.8 9 As Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, a leading
British scholar of the LOAC, once said,
87. See, e.g., PICTET, supra note 14, at 32 ("[IHRL is] a different sphere. It is no longer a
question of protecting man against the evils of war, but against the abuses of the State and the
vicissitudes of life."); Meyrowitz, supra note 39, at 1095-98.
88. See Shany, supra note 39, text accompanying nn.74-78 (outlining fundamental differences
between IHRL and LOAC).
89. See Eide, The Laws of War and Human Rights-Differences and Convergences, supra note
39, at 675, 683 ("[According to the model of sovereignty] which stems from human rights think-
ing,. . . 'the sovereign' simply is a coordinator and the executive agent of the common concern,
exercising authority only because and to the extent this is desired by the members of society.");
see also Meyrowitz, supra note 39, at 1099-1101 (arguing that whereas the LOAC is based in
large part on the feeling of compassion for enemies who have become victims (through capture,
sickness, wounding, and the like), IHRL places the individual face-to-face with his or her own
state "in a situation that can be antagonistic"; further, while the LOAC also upholds the rights of
prisoners of war and the population of territories occupied by a belligerent, the rights it pro-
2010]
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The attempt to confuse the two regimes of law is insupportable in
theory and inadequate in practice. The two regimes are not only
distinct but are diametrically opposed .... [A]t the end of the day,
the law of human rights seeks to reflect the cohesion and harmony
in human society and must, from the nature of things, be a different
and opposed law to that which seeks to regulate the conduct of hos-
tile relationships between states or other armed groups, and in in-
ternal rebellions. 90
These underlying differences between the two bodies of law help
explain why it makes good sense that most IHRL norms are "dero-
gable" in times of armed conflict or other public emergency, while
those of the LOAC are not. IHRL permits derogations of many
(though not all) of its norms because in proper circumstances those
derogations can be considered to be in the interest of the affected
population, that is, the state's own population.91 By contrast, the re-
quirements of the LOAC generally may not be suspended, however
grave the emergency, because the affected parties-non-nationals-
would not benefit from a hostile power's derogation.92 Moreover,
even when a hostile power may abridge or suspend a LOAC require-
ment, the law typically places severe restrictions on the breadth and
duration of that action.93
tects-unlike those of IHRL-are "the rights of an enemy citizen," and typically reflect "the
military interests and sovereignty of the enemy State").
90. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, supra note 39, at 199.
91. For example, ICCPR Article 12(1) ensures to "[e]veryone lawfully within the territory of a
State" the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" "within that
territory." ICCPR, supra note 70, at 176. Yet Article 12(3) permits restrictions on the right of
free movement, for example, when necessary to protect "national security, public order, public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others." Id. More importantly, the "derogation"
clause of the ICCPR, Article 4(1), permits derogations from the right to free movement "to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" "[in time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed." Id. at 175.
This clause has been understood to permit derogations during particular armed conflicts (includ-
ing internal ones), even if the emergency is geographically limited. See NOWAK, supra note 80, at
89-91. Thus, if bio-terrorists caused a "public emergency" by causing the outbreak of a highly
contagious and virulent disease in a particular part of the country, the public authorities might
well be permitted to quarantine that part of the country without violating the ICCPR. Such a
derogation from the right to free movement is ultimately justifiable on the grounds that the
general interest of the country's own population is best served by the quarantine.
92. See, e.g., Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, supra note 39, at 267
("[H]umanitarian law does not permit derogation on grounds of emergency, a rule that was
developed precisely for situations of the highest emergency.").
93. A good example is found in Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. That provision
flatly forbids "[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country
... regardless of their motive." Geneva IV, supra note 59, art. 49. The prohibition is aimed
primarily against the forcible removal of an enemy's civilian population from its usual abode,
and it plainly serves to protect that population from the animus, however disguised, of a hostile
occupying force. See, e.g., HCJ 785/87 Affo v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank
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The difference between IHRL's focus on protecting a state's domes-
tic population and the LOAC's focus on protecting non-nationals is
underscored in the case law. For example, the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council (U.K.) correctly held in Public Prosecutor v. Oie
Hee Koi94 that the protections of the Third Geneva Convention rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War did not extend to captured
enemy combatants who are either nationals of the detaining power or
non-nationals who owe a duty of allegiance to the detaining power.
Broadly speaking, whereas the LOAC is not concerned with protect-
ing individuals who belong to those two classes, they are the very fore-
most concerns of IHRL.
The fundamental divergences between IHRL's and the LOAC's
protective focuses also underlie the very different roles that the con-
cept of "proportionality" plays in the two bodies of law.95 Both re-
quire a "proportionality" (or cost-benefit) analysis with respect to the
use of lethal force. But in the case of IHRL, as also in constitutional
law, the interest of the target-as well as those of other, unintended
victims-must be weighed against the attacker's use of force, whereas
in the case of the LOAC, only the interests of civilian third parties can
be weighed against the attacker's, and the interests of a legitimate tar-
get do not enter into the calculus at all. In Tennessee v. Garner, the
U.S. Supreme Court evaluated the "fleeing felon" rule, which had per-
mitted the police to use lethal force against an unarmed suspected
felon who, when ordered to submit to arrest, took flight.96 The Court
balanced the fugitive's interest in his own life-an interest the Court
found so "fundamental" that it "need not be elaborated upon"-
against society's interest in a judicial determination of guilt and in
crime prevention, and it found that the balance tilted decid-
edly against the government. 97
[1988] IsrSC 42(2) 4, translated at 29 I.L.M. 140 (1990). Article 49 further includes an extremely
limited carve-out from this otherwise unqualified prohibition. That exception attests to the gen-
eral prohibition's scope and power:
[T]he Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the
security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations
may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occu-
pied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displace-
ment. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as
hostilities in the area in question have ceased ....
Geneva IV, supra note 59, art. 9.
94. [1968] A.C. 829, reprinted at 42 I.L.R. 441 (1971).
95. See PiCrET, supra note 14, at 27-30; Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 391 (1993).
96. 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
97. Id. at 9.
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Although Garner was a case decided under the Fourth Amend-
ment rather than IHRL, its reasoning is also characteristic of the lat-
ter.98 For instance, in its 2005 decision in Nachova v. Bulgaria-in
which Bulgarian nationals challenged the killing of unarmed Romani
deserters by Bulgarian military policeman-the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) stated,
There can be no [necessity to place human life at risk] where it is
known that the person to be arrested poses no threat to life or limb
and is not suspected of having committed a violent offence, even if a
failure to use lethal force may result in the opportunity to arrest the
fugitive being lost.99
Under the LOAC, however, while the proportionality analysis re-
quires a commander to appraise the "collateral damage" that his use
of lethal force may impose on unintended victims of the attack,10 0 he
does not need to give any weight to the legitimate target's interests in
remaining alive or unwounded. As Colonel Kenneth Watkin rightly
puts it,
An important distinction between [IHRL] and [the LOAC] in terms
of controlling the use of force is that the former seeks review of
98. The strong (and intended) similarities between IHRL and constitutional law (especially
that of the United States) have often been noted. See, e.g., Draper, Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights, supra note 39, at 198-99.
99. App. Nos. 43577/98, 43579/98, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 95 (sitting as Grand Chamber)
available at http://portal.coe.ge/downloads/Judgments/CASE%200F%20NACHOVA %20AND
%200THERS%20v.%20BULGARIA.pdf; see also Note, European Court of Human Rights
Finds Bulgaria Liable for Failure to Investigate Racially Motivated Killings, 119 HARV. L. REv.
1907 (2006). Similar is the ECHR's decision in Isayeva v. Russia, Case Nos. 57947/00, 57949/00,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=825661&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8614
2BF01C1166DEA398649. Isayeva involved an attack by Russian airplanes on a convoy of vehi-
cles in the Chechen conflict, which might be regarded as an internal armed conflict subject to
Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3. Although the attack resulted in civilian deaths,
the Russian government argued that the pilots were targeting armed men who had fired on the
planes from the vehicles. There was contrary testimony that there were no vehicles of that kind
and that no one had previously fired on the planes. In deciding the case, the Court made no
reference to the LOAC but relied instead entirely on IHRL. "[I]t is necessary to examine
whether the operation was planned and controlled by the authorities so as to minimize to the
greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force. The authorities must take appropriate care to
ensure that any risk to life in minimized." Id. 175. In Isayeva, as in Garner, the interests of all
the victims of the attack were considered. Had the Court relied on the LOAC, however, it would
have had to consider whether some of the occupants of the vehicles were combatants, and thus
legitimate targets. Because of the paucity of LOAC rules governing internal conflict, it is unclear
whether LOAC was in fact relevant to the incident. For commentary, see Lubell, supra note 39,
at 744.
100. "An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" is an indiscriminate attack. Addi-
tional Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 51(5)(b).
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every use of lethal force by agents of the state, while the latter is
based on the premise that force will be used and humans intention-
ally killed. In practical terms, a human rights supervisory frame-
work works to limit the development and use of a shoot-to-kill
policy, whereas [the LOAC] is directed toward controlling how such
a policy is implemented. 10 1
B. The ICCPR Does Not Regulate Armed Conflicts That Are
Governed by the LOAC
These general observations are confirmed by an examination of the
ICCPR (along with other IHRL and LOAC instruments). Consider
first the plain language of the ICCPR. 10 2 Under Article 2 of that
treaty, each state party undertakes "to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant." The conjunctive reference both
to a state's "territory" and to its "jurisdiction" plainly implies that the
ICCPR is not extraterritorially applicable and does not regulate the
state's dealings with the nationals of another power with which it is in
armed conflict, unless they happen to be on its territory. Given that
the ICCPR, in express terms, "applies only to individuals within the
territory of a state that is a party to it," it follows directly that the
treaty "is not applicable to acts of armed forces executed outside the
national territory of a party state. ' 10 3 This conclusion is buttressed by
the interpretive rule that even a human rights treaty "cannot impose
uncontemplated extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it
through no more than its general humanitarian intent."10 4
Further, even though the text of ICCPR Article 2 is unambiguous
on the point in question, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had
recourse to the travaux pr~paratoires [preparatory work] in its Advi-
sory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
Occupied Palestinian Territory,10 5 and we shall follow the ICJ's lead.
101. See Watkin, supra note 20, at 32.
102. A treaty "shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340
[hereinafter VCLT]; see also U.N. Doc. A/ES_10/L.18/Rev.1, [ 94 (July 9, 2004).
103. Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the Laws, supra
note 39, at 939; see also Dennis, supra note 39. But see Lubell, supra note 39; Meron, Extraterri-
toriality of Human Rights Treaties, supra note 39, at 79.
104. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 183 (1993).
105. U.N. Doc. A/ES_10/L.18/Rev.1, T 109 (July 9, 2004). Under the VCLT Article 32, the
ICJ should not have used the travaux prdparatoires as an interpretative aid unless reliance on the
ICCPR's "ordinary meaning" and other considerations mentioned in Article 31 "le[ftl the mean-
ing ambiguous or obscure" or "le[d] to a result which [was] manifestly absurd or unreasonable."
VCLT, supra note 102, art. 32. Neither of those conditions was met here.
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Unfortunately, the ICJ's discussion is both cursory-less than a full
numbered paragraph-and mistaken.10 6 Michael Dennis of the U.S.
State Department Legal Adviser's Office has reviewed the travaux
pr~paratoires more carefully and has shown that "[t]he preparatory
work cited by the [ICJ] actually establishes that the reference to
'within its territory' was included in Article 2(1) of the Covenant in
part to make clear that states were not obligated to ensure the rights
therein in territories under military occupation." 10 7  Eleanor
Roosevelt, the U.S. representative and then-Chair of the Commission
on Human Rights-the body that drafted the ICCPR-sought to add
the language "within its territory" to the draft of the Article, stating
that the United States was "particularly anxious" not to assume "an
obligation to ensure the rights recognized in [the draft ICCPR] to the
citizens of countries under United States occupation," which then in-
cluded Germany, Austria, and Japan. 10 8 Despite opposition, the
American view prevailed, and later attempts to delete "within its terri-
tory" were defeated.
The UNHRC,10 9 joined by some legal scholars, 110 has argued, how-
ever, for giving the ICCPR a broader scope, and its views were
adopted by the ICJ in the Wall Case."' In effect, these arguments
read the territorial restriction out of ICCPR Article 2 altogether. De-
spite the fact that it has received the ICJ's blessing, we find that inter-
pretation wholly unpersuasive.
First and most obviously, it violates the general rule of construction
that no word or phrase of a treaty should be considered to be mean-
ingless or idle.112 Furthermore, even a cursory comparison of the lan-
guage of ICCPR Article 2 with that of comparable human rights
instruments indicates that Article 2's reference to "territory" is not
106. Scholars have heavily criticized the Wall opinion on a variety of grounds. See, e.g., David
Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99
AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (2005); Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion:
An lpse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 62 (2005).
107. Dennis, supra note 39, at 123.
108. Id. at 124.
109. See General Comment No. 31, § 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Cove-
nant rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to
their jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid
down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State
Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.
Id. (emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., TOMUSCHAT, supra note 39, at 109-11.
111. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9, 2004).
112. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 303-04 (1933).
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mere surplusage. For example, Article 1 of the 1967 Optional Proto-
col to the ICCPR refers only to allegations of violations from "individ-
uals subject to [a state party's] jurisdiction," thus eliminating any
territorial element for jurisdiction.11 3 The omission seems clearly pur-
poseful. Article 1 of the 1953 European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms binds the state
parties to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms" that are defined in that treaty. 114 Indeed, even though the
key jurisdictional provision in Article 1 of the European Convention
lacks any express territorial limitation, the ECHR's case law "is quite
plain that liability for acts taking effect or taking place outside the
territory of a member state is exceptional and requires special justifi-
cation. ' 115 In other words, even though the European Convention
113. Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
114. Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
115. Al-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2008] 1 A.C. 153, 204 (H.L. 2007) (opinion of
Baroness Hale of Richmond). In Al-Skeini, the U.K. House of Lords considered suits brought
by survivors of five Iraqi civilian decedents allegedly wrongfully killed by British troops during
military operations in Iraq and of a sixth Iraqi civilian who had died while in British military
detention, allegedly after torture. Id. at 153. The cases implicated the question of whether the
European Human Rights Convention and the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998 (which imple-
mented that Convention) applied extraterritorially to the British military's actions in Iraq. Id.
The House of Lords denied relief to the first five claimants but remitted the sixth case to the
lower courts for further consideration. Id. at 154. A majority of the Lords considered the sixth
claimant's action sustainable on the theory that although the European Convention reflected a
territorial concept of jurisdiction, there were other, exceptional bases for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion in the particular circumstances of individual cases, and that although the United Kingdom's
military presence in Iraq did not pose such an exceptional case, the death of the sixth Iraqi
civilian while in detention at a British military base in Iraq could be analogized to the exception
that applies to purely territorial jurisdiction issues for incidents occurring at a state party's em-
bassies or consulates abroad. The opinions of several Law Lords examined the ECHR (or
"Strasbourg") case law on the extraterritorial scope of the Convention, including most impor-
tantly the ECHR's leading decision in Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335. Lord
Bingham of Cornhill (who, unlike the majority, would have ruled that the U.K. Human Rights
Act did not apply to any of the deaths at issue in the cases) did not reach the question of the
Convention's application to those events, but noted in dictum that
[a]lthough there have been a number of military missions involving contracting states
acting extra-territorially since their ratification of the convention (inter alia, in the
Gulf, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]), no state
has indicated a belief that its extra-territorial actions involved an exercise of jurisdic-
tion within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention by making a derogation pursuant
to article 15 of the Convention. So it does not appear that military action abroad has
generally been regarded as giving rise to an exception [from the general rule of
territoriality].
Id. at 189 (opinion of Lord Bingham) (emphasis added). Further, while noting that some Stras-
bourg case law had permitted extraterritorial applications of the Convention, Lord Bingham
opined that "these bases of exception can[not] be described as clear-cut, and the[ir] application
... to the situation of British troops operating in Iraq must, in my opinion, be regarded as
problematical." Id. Lord Rodger, while disagreeing with Lord Bingham on the extraterritorial
applicability of the U.K. Human Rights Act, followed Bankovic with regard to the scope of the
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makes no express reference to a territorial limitation, it should, absent
special justification, be construed to apply only within the territories
of the contracting parties. Likewise, Article 1 of the 1989 Convention
on the Rights of the Child 116 refers to the protection of children
"within [the state parties'] jurisdiction," also omitting any reference to
"territory." Again, the intent to give these treaties a broader field of
application than the ICCPR is manifest. Thus, Egon Schwelb wrote
that
[t]he words "within its territory" amount to a limitation of the scope
of the [ICCPR] in regard to which the [ICCPR] differs, e.g., from
the European Convention on Human Rights, by Art. 1 of which the
High Contracting Parties undertook to secure the rights and free-
doms "to everyone within their jurisdiction." Misgivings about this
restriction [in the ICCPR] were felt both in the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights and in the General Assembly. In a
separate vote on the words "within its territory" these words were
retained, however. 117
Moreover, if the ICCPR was indeed applicable to the extraterrito-
rial actions of a state party's military in situations of armed conflict, or
Convention. As he explained, the principal question in Bankovic was whether the Serbian vic-
tims of a NATO airstrike during the war in Kosovo were, by virtue of that attack alone, brought
within the "jurisdiction" of the state parties to the Convention who had participated in it. He
pointed out that the ECHR had
held that there was no jurisdictional link between the victims and the respondent states.
So the victims could not come within the jurisdiction of those states .... The decision in
Bankovic shows ... that an act which would engage the Convention if committed on
the territory of a contracting state does not ipso facto engage the Convention if carried
out by that contracting state on the territory of another state outside the Council of
Europe.
Id. at 199 (opinion of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry) (emphasis added). Baroness Hale's opinion
with respect to the ECHR case law is quoted in the text above. Lord Carswell agreed with the
opinions of Lords Rodger and Brown with respect to the extent of the Convention's jurisdiction,
but he noted that
such extraterritorial jurisdiction should be closely confined. It clearly exists by interna-
tional customary law in respect of embassies and consulates. It has been conceded by
the Secretary of State [for Defence] that it extended to a military prison in Iraq occu-
pied and controlled by agents of the United Kingdom. Once one gets past these cate-
gories, it would in my opinion require a high degree of control by the agents of the state
in an area of another state before it could be said that that area was within the jurisdic-
tion of the former. The test for establishing that is and should be stringent, and in my
judgment the British presence in Iraq falls well short of that degree of control.
Id. at 206 (opinion of Lord Carswell). Finally, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood analyzed
Bankovic and other Strasbourg case law very closely, and he concluded that the case law in its
entirety "should not be read as detracting in any way from the clear-and clearly restrictive-
approach to article 1 jurisdiction adopted in Bankovic." Id. at 215 (opinion of Lord Brown).
116. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Sept. 2, 1990).
117. Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of Decem-
ber 1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTs, supra note 69, at 109.
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even in post-conflict situations of belligerent occupation, anomalies
would soon arise. Most obviously, Article 6 of the ICCPR lays down
the nonderogable norm that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life." 118 But the intentional targeting of enemy forces engaged in
combat is plainly licensed by the LOAC-indeed, that very license is
the essence of such law. In The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau stated what has since become the generally accepted doctrine:
"The object of the war being the destruction of the hostile State, the
other side has the right to kill its defenders, while they are bearing
arms .... ."19 As Articles 14 and 15 of the Lieber Code put it,
14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations,
consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable
for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to
the modern law and usages of war.
15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb
of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is inci-
dentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war .... 120
Or, in the less forthright formulation of the contemporary LOAC,
combatants "have the right to participate directly in hostilities. '121
Of course, these basic principles of the LOAC might be reconciled
with the ICCPR's prohibition on the "arbitrary" deprivation of life if
the intentional killing of legitimate human targets in situations of
armed conflict-by forces licensed under the LOAC-were consid-
ered to be non-arbitrary. This seems, in effect, to have been the posi-
tion of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons CaseZ22-a point to which we
shall return in Part IV below.123 But to concede that is tantamount to
118. ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 6.
119. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 171 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1973)
(1762), available at http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm.
120. Lieber Code, supra note 55, arts. 14-15.
121. Additional Protocol I, supra note 10, art. 43; see also Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means
of Combat, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 443(2) (Dieter Fleck
ed., 2d ed. 2008) ("At the heart of the category of military objectives are the armed forces of the
adversary .... ). Further, combatants "receive immunity from prosecution, often termed as
'combat immunity,' for killing carried out in accordance with the law." Watkin, supra note 20, at
15. The privilege of combatants to kill lawfully during armed conflict underlies the LOAC's
fundamental "principle of distinction," which distinguishes combatants from civilians. It also
underlies the traditional LOAC distinction between "lawful" and "unprivileged" or "unlawful"
combatants, such as al Qaeda. Id. at 29 ("In international humanitarian law terms, [al Qaeda
combatants'] status is that of unprivileged belligerents and it does not change whether they are
operating outside or inside a state.").
122. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
240 25 (July 8) ("The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life ... falls to be determined
by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to
regulate the conduct of hostilities.").
123. See infra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
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saying that the LOAC, rather than ICCPR Art. 6, regulates such uses
of lethal force.
Other provisions of the LOAC would also appear to be inapplicable
if the ICCPR were held to reach all the extraterritorial activities of a
state party's military. Consider, for example, the assumption that the
ICCPR governs the activities of a state party's armed forces during a
belligerent occupation.12 4 Were that so, then presumably the occupy-
ing power would be bound to apply the provisions of the ICCPR, un-
less they were derogable under Article 4(1). The standard for
derogability is high under the latter clause: among other conditions, a
derogation is permissible only "[i]n time of public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed." In most circumstances, therefore, the occupying power
will have to ensure to the population of the occupied territory "the
rights recognized in the [ICCPRI, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status." However, the
LOAC rules that deal with occupied territories generally require the
occupying power to maintain the pre-occupation legal regime.
125
Thus, Article 43 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention (No. IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 126 provides that
the occupying power "shall... respect[ ], unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country."'1 27 But an occupying power would be
hard put to comply with both the ICCPR norm of nondiscrimination
and the LOAC norm of maintaining the occupied territory's prior le-
gal system intact when the ousted government's laws had discrimi-
124. This assumption might be defended either on the grounds that territoriality was simply
not a jurisdictional predicate for the applicability of the ICCPR (the UNHRC position we have
hitherto been examining) or on the more plausible grounds that Article 2's reference to territori-
ality has to be interpreted functionally, so that militarily occupied territory-at least if the occu-
pation is prolonged-would have to be deemed a state party's "territory" within the meaning of
the Article.
125. See, e.g., The Krupp Trial: Trial of Alfred Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach and
Eleven Others, in How DoEs LAW PROTECT IN WAR?, supra note 81, at 666. See generally Ardi
Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 65, 86-93 (2003). This "conservationist" principle undoubtedly applies in cases of
belligerent occupations such as that of Iraq. See S.C. Res. 1483, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483
(May 22, 2002); see also AI-Jedda v. Sec'y of State for Defence, 12008] A.C. 332, 1 10, 32 (H.L.
2007) (lead opinion of Lord Bingham) Whether it also applies to what Professor Adam Roberts
calls "transformative" military occupations is a question we need not discuss here. See Adam
Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 589-95 (2006).
126. Oct. 18, 1907, T.S. No. 539, reprinted in 1 BEVANS 631 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).
127. The ICJ considers these Hague rules to be customary law as well. See Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 135, 172 89 (July 9).
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nated with respect to ICCPR-guaranteed rights on the basis of race,
sex, language, religion, or some other forbidden characteristic. As
Lord Brown pointed out in his opinion in the House of Lords' 2007
decision in Al-Skeini, it was mistaken to argue that the United King-
dom, as a belligerent occupier of Iraq, was bound to apply the Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention throughout the areas that it
occupied; on the contrary,
the occupants' obligation is to respect "the laws in force", not to
introduce laws and the means to enforce them (for example, courts
and a justice system) such as to satisfy the requirements of the Con-
vention. Often (for example, where Sharia law is in force) Conven-
tion rights would clearly be incompatible with the laws of the
territory occupied.' 28
There are also other points at which the ICCPR could readily col-
lide with the LOAC if both were held to govern the conduct of an
occupying power. For example, ICCPR Article 8(3)(a) provides that
"[n]o one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory la-
bour."129 Under Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, how-
ever, the occupying power may compel protected persons over the age
of eighteen to perform work "which is necessary ... for the needs of
the army of occupation.' 130 In all such cases of conflicting duties,
moreover, it would appear that the ICCPR would prevail over the
LOAC rules of belligerent occupation because Article 5 of the ICCPR
states that "[n]othing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as
implying for any State ... any right to engage in any activity or per-
form any act aimed at... the[ ] limitation [of the rights and freedoms
recognized herein] to a greater extent than is provided for in the pre-
sent Covenant. ' 131 But that conclusion contradicts the ICJ's assump-
tion that in the event of a conflict, the LOAC, as a lex specialis
adapted to belligerent occupation, should be followed.132
Starting from the premise that the ICCPR applies to the extraterri-
torial activities of a state party's military in situations of armed con-
flict or belligerent occupation, therefore, one appears to be irresistibly
driven to a choice between two equally implausible alternatives. One
is that the ICCPR displaces the LOAC altogether. The other is that
128. Al-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2008] 1 A.C. 153, 215 (opinion of Lord Brown).
129. ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 8(3).
130. Geneva IV, supra note 59, art. 51.
131. ICCPR, supra note 70, art 5(1).
132. See Dale Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict-The Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 2
(2001) (noting that the Nuclear Weapons Case "gave formal primacy to the law of armed conflict
when interpreting the applicability of specific provisions of the ICCPR").
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the international legal regime governing armed conflict is a pastiche.
Selected provisions of the ICCPR are held to be applicable to situa-
tions of armed conflict, but no intelligible principle for determining
which provisions are incorporated and which are not is apparent, and
no evidence seems to suggest that the state parties to the ICCPR in-
tended some, but not others, of its provisions to apply in those
circumstances.
The ICJ's Advisory Opinion in the Wall Case133 clearly illustrates
the difficulties of the latter alternative. 134 In holding the ICCPR to be
applicable along with the LOAC in Palestinian territory under Israel's
belligerent occupation, the court stated that "some rights may be ex-
clusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be ex-
clusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of
both these branches of international law. 1 35 Yet the court failed to
provide any guiding principles as to when IHRL rules applied in a
situation of armed conflict (or post-conflict occupation) instead of, or
in addition to, the LOAC rules.136
The older understanding of the relationship of the LOAC and the
ICCPR seems to us, therefore, far more plausible and coherent than
the newer one. We conclude that the LOAC constitutes the legal re-
gime governing situations of armed conflict, and that the ICCPR is a
territorial legal regime broadly applicable to the relations between a
133. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 135 (July 9).
134. See also Noam Lubell, Challenges in Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87
INT'L REV. RED CRoss 737, 740-41 (2005) ("[A]cceptance that human rights law may extend to
extraterritorial actions does not rule out the consideration that if these actions are taking place
in the context of an armed conflict, the content of the rights may need to be interpreted in light
of applicable rules of [the LOAC]."). What is missing is a coherent principle for deciding how to
modify or displace the relevant LOAC rules.
135. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. at 178, 106.
136. See Dennis, supra note 39, at 133. Yet another example of such a pastiche can be found
in Lord Bingham of Cornwall's lead opinion for the House of Lords in its decision in Al-Jedda v.
Secretary of State for Defence, [2008] A.C. 332 (lead opinion of Lord Bingham). The key ques-
tion there was whether Article 5 the European Convention on Human Rights and its implement-
ing U.K. statute applied to the allegedly wrongful internment by U.K. military forces in British-
occupied Iraq of a suspected terrorist of dual U.K.-Iraqi nationality. Id. $1 1-3. The House of
Lords dismissed the complaint. Id. 9 44, 120, 129, 137. Noting the conflict between the United
Kingdom's responsibilities as an occupier acting under the authorization of the Security Council
and its duty to secure fundamental human rights to those-like the plaintiff-internee-under its
"jurisdiction," Lord Bingham wrote that "the UK may lawfully, where it is necessary for impera-
tive reasons of security, exercise the power to detain ..., but must ensure that the detainees's
rights under article 5 are not infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such detention."
Id. 1 39. The result is that the protections of Article 5 are to be merged, to some undetermined
extent, with the Hague/Geneva rules relating to internment, at least where the internee is a
national of the occupying power.
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state party and its own population (broadly defined), except when cer-
tain of its provisions are expressly (or by ineluctable inference) appli-
cable to armed conflict.1 37
Again, however, we must stress that we are not speaking here of
"internal" armed conflicts or of belligerent occupations, especially
prolonged ones. It may well be that IHRL is applicable, at least to
some degree, in conflicts of an "internal" nature. For one thing, such
conflicts may occur entirely within the territory of an ICCPR state
party, and those involved in the conflict may all (or nearly all) be sub-
ject to the state's jurisdiction. Absent a valid derogation, therefore,
the ICCPR would seem to continue to apply in full. Furthermore, the
conventional LOAC governing "internal" armed conflicts is rather
meager. Additional Protocol II is the most developed body of treaty
law relating to conflicts of this nature, but it covers only a small seg-
ment of internal conflicts, and its substantive provisions are few.138
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is also a conventional
LOAC that applies to "internal" armed conflicts, but it too has very
limited substantive implications. In these circumstances, it may seem
sensible to assume that the IHRL applies. Furthermore, as a practical
matter, a state engaged in armed conflict against insurgents, rebels,
137. See Dennis, supra note 39, at 139 ("[T]he best reading of the interrelationship between
the ICCPR and [the LOAC] is the more traditional view that [the LOAC] should be applied as
the lex specialis in determining what a state's obligations are during armed conflict or military
occupation.").
[A]cts of terrorism on the scale now threatened bring new challenges to the traditional
human rights concepts regarding the use of force. Moreover, the attempt to apply
human rights standards to a situation of armed conflict could have an adverse impact
on the integrity and strength of peacetime norms. Rather than attempt to extend
human rights norms to an armed conflict scenario, the appropriate approach is to apply
the lex specialis of humanitarian law.
Watkin, supra note 20, at 22; see also Al-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2008] 1 A.C. 153,
187-88 (opinion of Lord Bingham) (noting that even if remedies under the U.K. Human Rights
Act are unavailable for misconduct by British military towards Iraqi civilians, remedies exist
under the LOAC and service discipline acts). We do not of course mean to say that the ICCPR
has no relevance in wartime situations whatsoever. On the contrary, as we have noted, the
norms of the ICCPR remain generally applicable even in wartime in what may be called the
"home front," and Article 4 of the ICCPR permits wartime derogations from some (but not all)
of its norms only in restricted conditions. But to say that the ICCPR applies to the home front in
wartime is not to say that it reaches the battlefield or occupied territory.
138. See Oeter, supra note 20, at 204-05 (stating that Protocol I is "a strange torso .... In
substantive part ... the Protocol is extremely poor."); Smith, supra note 8, at 77 ("The protec-
tions in Protocol II are minimal in comparison with the humanitarian laws governing the United
States during an international armed conflict."). Draper asserts that Protocol II is
a debilitated replica of Protocol I. The material field of application of Protocol II... is
virtually commensurate with a classical civil war, but without the need for belligerent
recognition. The rules established in the protocol, however, unlike common article 3,
are not express obligations imposed upon parties to the internal conflict ....
Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, supra note 39, at 202.
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secessionists, or other "internal" opponents may well find it advanta-
geous to follow IHRL norms in that conflict because a pattern of vio-
lating such norms will be likely both to alienate its own population
and to cost it international support. The difficulty is, however, that
the obligations of IHRL are asymmetrical: the state party to the inter-
nal conflict will be bound by the ICCPR, but its opponents will not be,
and indeed they may even lack the competence to become parties to
that or any other treaty.' 39 Moreover, even if an insurgent group were
able to enter into a "special agreement" of the kind contemplated by
Common Article 3 (or of other kinds), 140 and were thus in a position
to bind itself to ICCPR-type norms, would it usually have the incen-
tives to do So?141 Thus, even if IHRL can be said to extend-on the
state's side-to internal armed conflicts, it is hard to see how it could
reach all of the parties to such a conflict. 42
139. See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention, 46
VA. J. INT'L L. 131, 140-41 (2005). We note, however, that some state practice evidences a
willingness to regard agreements with particular national liberation movements, if they have
received international recognition, as international treaties. See ANTONIO CASSESSE, SELF-DE-
TERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 168-69 (1995).
140. See Oeter, supra note 20, at 211 (citing the example of a Common Article 3 "special
agreement" in an internal Yugoslav conflict).
141. We should emphasize that differently situated insurgent groups are likely to have signifi-
cantly different motivational structures, especially with regard to their treatment of civilian
populations. See JEREMY M. WEINSTEIN, INSIDE REBELLION: THE POLITICS OF INSURGENT VIO-
LENCE (Margaret Levi ed., 2007) (arguing that recruitment patterns for insurgent groups differ in
resource-rich and resource-poor contexts, with consequent differences in groups' attitudes to-
wards and treatment of civilians). Nonetheless, our basic point still stands: even accepting that
the contexts in which insurgent groups operate will differentiate their attitudes towards civilians,
many such groups would seem to have little or no incentive to observe general IHRL norms. On
the other hand, it is plausible to argue that insurgents will often have incentives to comply with
LOAC norms; and, if so, why not with IHRL norms as well? See MICHAEL N. ScriErrr,
CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 1 (2006).
Compliance with this Manual will benefit every party to the hostilities .... First, the
provisions that the Manual contains are compatible with effective and efficient conduct
of operations.... Second, non-compliance through harsh and inhumane behaviour will
alienate potential allies, both on the domestic and international level.... Third, com-
pliance will facilitate ending the hostilities and promote resolution of the conflict....
Finally, "winning the peace" in the long term following a non-international conflict
presupposes national reconciliation.
Id.
142. See Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, supra note 39, at 203-04.
[O]nce the international law of armed conflicts is applicable to an internal conflict, the
regime of human rights, applicable in time of normality, is not adequate to provide a
system of rules for regulation of the conflict situation .... [IHRL] rights operate in
times of normality, on the basis of harmony and cohesion between government and
governed and are neither designed for nor adequate to control an armed conflict be-
tween government and dissident armed or unarmed, elements of the population.
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C. Response to Counterarguments
As well as enjoying the support of the UNHRC and, more recently,
of the ICJ, the interpretation of the ICCPR that we are criticizing has
also been advanced by legal scholars. Our evaluation and critique
would therefore be incomplete unless we addressed those scholars'
writings. We shall single out two in particular: Professor (now ICJ
Judge) Thomas Buergenthal's highly influential 1981 essay, To Respect
and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations,43 and a
2006 article by the ICRC legal expert, Professor Louise Doswald-
Beck, entitled The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does International
Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?144
1. Buergenthal
Buergenthal argues for the extraterritorial application of the
ICCPR. He maintains that ICCPR Article 2(1)'s phrase "within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction" is "clearly" disjunctive rather
than conjunctive. 145 The conjunctive reading, he asserts, "is specious
and would produce results that were clearly not intended."'1 46 He
reasons,
[The conjunctive reading] would compel the conclusion, for exam-
ple, that a person who is temporarily outside his country no longer
enjoys the right proclaimed in Article 12(4) not to be "deprived of
the right to enter his own country," although that provision is
plainly designed to protect only individuals who happen to be
outside their country. It would be equally absurd to assume that
one who avails himself of the right to leave his country, established
in Article 12(2), gives up all the other rights that the Covenant en-
sures, including, inter alia, the right to reenter his country. Similarly
Article 14(3)(d) provides for "the right to be tried in his presence"
and outlaws in absentia criminal trials. Interpreting the Covenant as
providing that a criminal defendant is entitled to protection against
in absentia trials only when he is in the territory of the state, but not
when he is outside, is patently absurd.147
We agree, of course, that these results are absurd. And it is a well-
established rule that "[g]eneral terms should be so limited in their ap-
plication as not to lead to ... an absurd consequence. 148
143. Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Dero-
gations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RiGrrs: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGrrs (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
144. Doswald-Beck, supra note 39, at 881.
145. Buergenthal, supra note 143, at 74.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868).
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But it is an obvious fallacy to conclude, as Buergenthal does, that
the ICCPR in its entirety must be given extraterritorial application.
The absurdity that arises when particular clauses are not applied ex-
traterritorially (in some or all instances) does not entail that every
clause in the ICCPR is (or is presumptively) extraterritorial in scope.
His exceptions would swallow the rule. The fact that it would be ab-
surd to apply the medieval Bolognese law, which prohibited the draw-
ing of blood on a street, to a surgeon who was performing an
emergency, life-saving operation does not mean that the statute could
not be applied to a duelist. Likewise, the fact that it would be absurd
to apply a law forbidding interference with the delivery of the mail to
a sheriff serving an arrest warrant on a mail carrier who had been
charged with murder 149 does not make that statute inapplicable to a
defendant who was seeking to steal the mail.
Further, by reasoning akin to Buergenthal's, it would be possible to
show that the ICCPR also cannot apply in full within the territory of a
state party. Suppose that a large group of al Qaeda terrorists made
their way by force into the United States and began committing acts
of violence on a mass scale. They would be "within the territory" of
the United States and, at least arguably, "subject to its jurisdiction."
Does it follow that they are clothed with all the protections of the
ICCPR? Or would not that result be "absurd"? Or consider a cap-
tured al Qaeda combatant who was brought within United States ter-
ritory and detained here by the government for compelling reasons of
national security. Would that detainee enjoy all the protections of the
ICCPR? Or would not such a reading of the ICCPR produce "results
that were clearly not intended"?
Buergenthal also argues that
[t]he terms "territory" and "jurisdiction" as used in Article 2(1) may
take on special meaning in special situations-for example, where a
state party to the Covenant is in actual control of all or a part of the
territory of another state and is alleged to be violating the rights of
individuals in that territory. 150
For support, he cites the 1975 decision of the European Commission
on Human Rights in Cyprus v. Turkey,151 which interpreted Article 1
149. See id.
150. Buergenthal, supra note 143, at 76.
151. 1975 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 83 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). The Commission's conclusion
that the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus brought Turkey's actions within the "jurisdic-
tion" of Article 1 of the European Convention has subsequently been accepted by the European
Court of Human Rights. See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 245, 247 (Eur.
Ct. of H.R.); see also A1-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2008] 1 A.C. 153, 210 114
(opinion of Lord Brown).
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of the European Convention on Human Rights. As discussed above,
that Article provides that state parties-which included both Cyprus
and Turkey-"shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in section I of this Convention. ' 152 Tur-
key contended that although it had invaded Cyprus, it had neither an-
nexed it nor established a military or civil government there, and that
it could be held liable only for violations of the Convention within its
own territory. 153 The Commission rejected Turkey's argument, inter-
preting the term "jurisdiction" functionally, so as to include all per-
sons under Turkey's "actual authority and responsibility, whether [its]
authority is exercised within [its] own territory or abroad. '154 Bu-
ergenthal deduces that "just as a sound test for determining 'jurisdic-
tion' is actual authority, the test for determining what is a state party's
'territory' should also take into account the reality of 'authority' or
'control.' "155
One problem with Buergenthal's analysis is that if he were correct,
the United States would have been liable for any ICCPR violations it
committed in the territories-Germany, Japan, and Austria-that the
U.S. military was occupying as the drafting of ICCPR Article 2(1) was
taking place. As we have seen, however, the travaux prdparatoires
make perfectly clear that the United States' delegation sponsored the
incorporation of the phrase "within its territory" into Article 2(1) pre-
cisely to avoid the possibility of being held liable for ICCPR violations
there. The United States' position-which Buergenthal's brief review
of the travaux prdparatoires does not discuss-prevailed. Conse-
quently, Buergenthal's proposed reading of Article 1 would negate
the intentions of the states who drafted and voted on Article 2(1), and
of those in the General Assembly who approved those intentions.
Furthermore, Buergenthal's analysis overreads the decision in the
Cyprus case. It was entirely reasonable for the Commission to hold
Turkey liable for any Convention violations that it committed in the
parts of Cyprus that the Turkish military was occupying, given that (1)
the Convention would have applied to the whole of Cyprus in the ab-
sence of Turkey's occupation of part of it, and (2) Turkey, like Cyprus,
was a party to the Convention.156 It would have been incongruous in
those circumstances to hold that Turkey's invasion and occupation of
152. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 114, art. 1.
153. Cyprus v. Turkey, 1975 Y.B. Eur. Cony. H.R. at 116.
154. Id. at 118.
155. Buergenthal, supra note 143, at 77.
156. See Juliane Kokott & Beate Rudolf, Loizidou v. Turkey, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 98, 101
(1996).
2010]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
northern Cyprus relieved Turkey from observing the obligations of the
Convention in Cyprus. As the ECHR itself has subsequently recog-
nized, the extension of the jurisdictional provision of the European
Convention on Human Rights to the situation in Cyprus was intended
to avoid a "vacuum in human rights' protection" when the territory
"would normally be covered by the Convention" ... (i.e. in a Coun-
cil of Europe country) where otherwise (as in Northern Cyprus) the
inhabitants "would have found themselves excluded from the bene-
fits of the Convention safeguards and system which they had previ-
ously enjoyed."'1 57
The original Cyprus case therefore has been sharply limited by later
ECHR case law and cannot be used to defend Buergenthal's revision-
ary interpretation of ICCPR Article 2(1).
2. Doswald-Beck
In a wide and illuminating review of recent thinking about the rela-
tionships between the LOAC and IHRL, Professor Louise Doswald-
Beck raises the question of "whether human rights law adds extra con-
ditions to the [LOAC] prohibitions on attack, that is, in addition to the
prohibition of attacking combatants hors de combat [outside of com-
bat]. ... "158 Assuming that the answer is "clearly" yes in the cases of
belligerent occupation and non-international armed conflicts, she then
asks whether the same might be true of international armed conflicts,
and she remarks,
Theoretically, from the point of view of human rights law, there is
no reason why not, provided that there is jurisdiction. It would
make most sense in the case of civilians taking "a direct part in hos-
tilities", since it is unclear under [the LOAC] what this encompasses
exactly. It would be more difficult, however, in the case of combat-
ants. [LOAC] treaties do not provide a rule that ... a combatant
An interpretation restricting the Convention to acts by state authorities within their
own territory would have prevented the protection of human rights where it is most
needed: in the territory of Northern Cyprus, where the authorities of one high con-
tracting party cannot exercise their jurisdiction because of the intervention of another
state party to the Convention.
Id.
157. Al-Skeini, [2008] 1 A.C. at 209 (opinion of Lord Brown) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting and paraphrasing Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335).
[I]t would appear that the [ECHR] regards extraterritorial military operations to come
within the jurisdiction of a contracting state only in cases similar to the Northern Cy-
prus situation; not only must that state have effective control over a territory, but the
territory must itself have enjoyed the protection of the Convention prior to the military
operation.
Alexandra Rdth & Mirja Trilsch, Bankovic v. Belgium (Admissibility). App. No. 52207/99, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 168, 171 (2003)
158. Doswald-Beck, supra note 39, at 900 (author's translation).
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may not be attacked if he or she may be arrested. However, in this
author's opinion, the reason for this absence should be looked at
more carefully, in particular in the light of the old rule concerning
the prohibition of assassination, in order to see whether the human
rights rule is so very different from the original rules and philosophy
of [the LOAC. 159
Doswald-Beck then reviews the traditional LOAC prohibitions on
assassinations. As representative of this older thinking, she cites Arti-
cle 148 of the Lieber Code:
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual be-
longing to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile
government an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any cap-
tor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such interna-
tional outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The
sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in conse-
quence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civi-
lized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the
assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.
Doswald-Beck argues that the material basis for the older ban on
assassinations lay in the fact that the hostilities were normally carried
out by close fighting between combatants in land battles or by sieges.
Arrest was not a realistic option in those circumstances because unless
an enemy combatant was killed or severely incapacitated by wound-
ing, he might well continue fighting. The ban on assassinations arose
in those conditions because and insofar as it involved treachery. In
contemporary international armed conflict, however, "hostilities now
occur not only during battles on the ground but also from a distance
by aircraft and missiles. 1 60 Consequently (she appears to say), the
ban on assassination no longer survives in international armed con-
flict. It appears (although she does not spell this out) that the reason
for its disappearance must be that aerial warfare, unlike land warfare,
precludes the possibility of treachery.
Doswald-Beck seems to argue, however, that the reasons for the
traditional LOAC ban on assassinations continue to hold true in the
contexts of non-international war and belligerent occupation. Her
chief reason appears to be that in those circumstances, government
forces can arrest suspected insurgents or other enemy combatants
with no greater risk to themselves than the police normally encounter
in arresting dangerous persons. She concludes,
159. Id.
160. Id. at 902. Oddly, Doswald-Beck appears to overlook the use of artillery during tradi-
tional land warfare, which, no less than aircraft and missiles, involved killing at a distance.
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[U]nder the traditional law of war, killing combatants in such situa-
tions [that is, where arresting them was possible] would have been
considered an assassination. Is human rights law therefore so in-
compatible, at least with the original rules and philosophy of the law
of war? In the view of this author, the specific rules of human rights
law as they apply to the right to life, and as these have been inter-
preted in practice, are not incompatible.16 1
We find Doswald-Beck's arguments unconvincing. Contrary to her
view, we agree with the view that "the legitimacy of the killing and
destruction in a conventional war necessarily entails accepting the le-
gitimacy of targeted killings in the war against terror."'1 62
To begin with, the LOAC simply does not forbid the use of lethal
force even against an unsuspecting enemy combatant, and even if he is
not actively participating in hostilities and poses no immediate dan-
ger.163 Consider here the use of snipers. Sniping is a lawful method of
warfare in international armed conflict, even though there is an ele-
ment of surprise or "treachery" in it.164 Moreover, a sniper may law-
161. Id.
162. Statman, supra note 2, at 180.
163. See Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives Under the Current Jus in Bello, 78 J.
INT'L L. STUD. 139, 153-54 (2002).
As a rule, when a person takes up arms or merely dons a uniform as a member of the
armed forces, he automatically exposes himself to enemy attack (even if he does not
participate in actual hostilities and does not pose an immediate threat to the enemy).
The jus in bello prohibits treacherous assassination, yet nothing prevents singling out as
a target an individual enemy combatant (provided that the attack is carried out by
combatants). The prohibition of assassination does not cover "attacks, by regular
armed military forces, on specific individuals who are themselves legitimate military
targets." The United States was, consequently, well within its rights during World War
II when it specifically targeted the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet, Admiral
Yamamoto, whose plane was ambushed (subsequent to the successful breaking of the
Japanese communication codes) and shot down over Bougainville in 1943.
Id. (citation and footnotes omitted). Likewise, the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile was
within its rights when, with British assistance, it enabled two Czechoslovakian commandos to
target and kill Reinhard Heydrich, the Nazi "viceroy" of the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia,
in May 1942. See CALLUM McDONALD, THE KILLING OF REINHARD HEYDRICH: THE SS
"BUTCHER OF PRAGUE" (1998).
164. See W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law-The Legality of Snipers, ARMY LAW., Dec.
1992, at 3, 3.
Enemy combatants are lawful targets at all times, wherever they may be located, re-
gardless of the activity in which they are engaged when they are attacked....
Soldiers lawfully may be attacked behind their lines by any lawful means. A sniper's
work is indistinguishable from a law of war standpoint from other lawful means. ...
•.. [Slniping does not afford an enemy combatant an opportunity to run, fight, surren-
der, or die. Neither does an artillery barrage or rocket attack, a land mine, an ambush,
a commando raid, or an airstrike. Attack of enemy personnel by any lawful means,
including sniping, is neither assassination nor murder-it is lawful killing. The element
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fully take an enemy combatant's life even without affording him the
opportunity to surrender, and sniper fire is allowed even when the
target is not present in the zone of hostilities. But if snipers may be
used lawfully in international armed conflict to kill an unsuspecting
Army cook while he is peeling potatoes in a camp that is far from the
front, why may they not be used, for example, to kill an al Qaeda
leader in the mountains of Afghanistan? And if snipers may be used,
why not drones armed with Predator missiles?
We see no reason why these general LOAC rules should vary de-
pending on the nature of the armed conflict. Thus, while we agree
with Doswald-Beck that the contemporary LOAC related to interna-
tional conflicts plainly does not ban what might be seen as the "assas-
sination" of enemy combatants, we see no reason to distinguish that
situation from non-international-including transnational-armed
conflict. In all these types of conflict, it may sometimes be possible to
arrest an enemy combatant rather than to kill or wound him. But the
LOAC governing international conflicts does not prohibit the use of
lethal force against such an enemy even then.165 Why then should the
LOAC for non-international conflicts do so? Moreover, the fact that
an armed conflict is "internal," or that it is occurring during a military
occupation, hardly entails that it will be easier to arrest enemy com-
batants than it usually is in international conflicts. Indeed, arrests may
frequently be more difficult to make in internal conflicts because an
enemy combatant will often be non-uniformed, and hence harder to
visibly distinguish from the surrounding civilian population. 66
Second, to the extent that the traditional ban on assassination
rested on the detestation of treachery-rather than the difficulty or
unlikelihood of making an arrest-the advent of aerial warfare should
not have resulted in the disappearance of the ban because aerial war-
fare, no less than land warfare, may involve killing persons who have
no reason to put themselves on guard. The use of unmanned drones
equipped with missiles surely illustrates that fact. But if for some rea-
son the traditional ban on assassination has been eroded by the wide-
of surprise is a fundamental principle of war, and does not make an otherwise legiti-
mate act of violence unlawful.
Id.; accord UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 62,
5.12 (2005).
165. See Parks, supra note 164, at 3 ("Enemy combatants are lawful targets at all times, wher-
ever they may be located, regardless of the activity in which they are engaged when they are
attacked.").
166. See HCJ 3799/02 Adalah v. GOC Central Command IDF [2005] IsrSC J 16 (opinion of
Barak, P.), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/7FFDDA5378172C9CC12573870052330F
(discussing the difficulties of arresting terrorist suspects during the Intifada).
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spread use of aircraft and missiles in contemporary armed conflict,
that ban should be as inapplicable in non-international conflicts as it is
in international ones.
Third, if we are to resurrect the older law of war, as Doswald-Beck
recommends, why should we not revive that part of it that permits the
summary killing of saboteurs? Answering Doswald-Beck's citation to
the Lieber Code with one of our own, we would point to Article 82,
which states,
Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting,
or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, with-
out commission, without being part and portion of the organized
hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who
do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or
with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pur-
suits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of
soldiers-such men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and
therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners
of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or
pirates.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE AL-HARETHI INCIDENT
In light of the preceding analysis, we now turn to the particular
point at issue: whether the United States' use of an unmanned drone
armed with a Predator missile to kill suspected al Qaeda terrorist
leader Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi and his traveling companions in
Yemen was a violation of the ICCPR. We shall consider here the re-
cent article by Professor Philip Alston, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, and
his co-authors, dealing with that subject. 167
Our treatment can be brief, both because our prior analysis has de-
fended many of the core claims that we would make in response to
Alston, and because Alston's argument hinges crucially on the ICJ's
jurisprudence, most especially its construction of the ICCPR in the
Nuclear Weapons case. If the ICJ's reasoning fails there, then the cen-
terpiece of the Special Rapporteur's argument fails as well.
The key paragraphs in his article are as follows:
In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Court stated that
the arbitrary deprivation of life in armed conflict "falls to be deter-
mined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostili-
ties". The United States position appears to be that this statement
affirms the notion that the humanitarian law regime completely dis-
167. See Alston et al., supra note 39.
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places the human rights law regime in the context of armed conflict.
This is a misreading of the ICJ's statement on lex specialis because it
takes that statement out of context and disregards the rest of the
paragraph within which it is couched. Taken in full, that paragraph
of Nuclear Weapons says:
The Court observes that the protection of the Interna-
tional Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of
the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be dero-
gated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for
the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In princi-
ple, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life
applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary
deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by
the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of
hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through
the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered
an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the
Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law ap-
plicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms
of the Covenant itself.
Thus, the Court asserts in its opening sentence the overriding princi-
ple that in fact the Covenant does continue to apply during armed
conflict and specifically reiterates that "the right not arbitrarily to
be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities." The Court then
makes clear that its statement on lex specialis applies at the level of
interpreting individual human rights law provisions, such as the pro-
hibition on the arbitrary deprivation of life. The United States has
read the lex specialis test to apply so that the entire legal regime of
international humanitarian law replaces the entire regime of human
rights law during armed conflict, a position not justified by the text
of the Advisory Opinion. 168
Thus, the Special Rapporteur assumes that the question of the le-
gality of the United States' action in killing al-Harethi reduces to a
dispute over the construction of the ICJ Advisory Opinion in Nuclear
Weapons-an opinion that he further assumes to be both correct on
the law and controlling in its application. But even if the Special Rap-
porteur's construction of the ICJ's language in Nuclear Weapons is
sound, while the construction that he attributes to the United States is
mistaken, the question whether the ICJ's language, so construed, is
legally correct demands to be considered. In light of our previous
analysis, we believe that the understanding of the ICCPR, which the
Special Rapporteur takes the ICJ to have adopted, is plainly
erroneous.
168. Id. at 192-93 (footnotes omitted).
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The language that the Special Rapporteur quotes from Nuclear
Weapons starts, uncontroversially enough, with the proposition that
the protection of the ICCPR "does not cease in times of war," except
when a proper derogation is made. We, of course, concur. The
ICCPR covers the relations between a state and those both in its terri-
tory and also subject to its jurisdiction even in wartime, and the possi-
bility of derogation would make little sense if this were not so. The
ICJ next observes, again uncontroversially, that the ICCPR's prohibi-
tion on the arbitrary killing of those whom it protects is nonderogable,
even in wartime; and again, we of course agree. But from those unex-
ceptionable premises, the ICJ-as the Special Rapporteur reads Nu-
clear Weapons-then affirms that the ICCPR's prohibition on
arbitrary killing extends to conditions in combat, traditionally regu-
lated by the LOAC, in which the military forces of a state use lethal
force to kill or wound an enemy combatant. That deduction is a flat
and obvious non sequitur.
Moreover, the ICJ-on the Special Rapporteur's account-makes
that wholly unwarranted inference with no reference whatsoever to
the jurisdictional language of Article 2 of the ICCPR; to the intent of
the state parties that ratified that clause of the ICCPR, or to the deci-
sions of the General Assembly with respect to it; to any ensuing state
practice (including derogations); 169 to the general purposes of the
ICCPR, as distinct from those of the LOAC; to the traditional under-
standing of the fundamental divergences between the ICCPR and the
LOAC; to the language of the jurisdictional provisions of other com-
parable IHRL instruments, including the European Convention and
both the national and international case law construing those provi-
sions; or to any legal scholarship. In short, in the Special Rapporteur's
view, the ICJ has superimposed the ICCPR on all cases of armed con-
flict by the merest judicial fiat.
Further, the practical applications of the ICCPR to the combat situ-
ations that the United States faces in the conflict with al Qaeda-so
far as the ICJ can be understood to give any intelligible instruction on
those matters at all-are absurd. It would seem, for example, that the
U.S. military would have had an obligation to arrest al-Harethi, even
at some risk to its own personnel, had that been feasible, rather than
to have fired on him at sight. As we have seen, the LOAC has never
169. Cf. A1-Jedda v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2008] A.C. 332, $ 38 (lead opinion of Lord
Bingham), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/
jd071212/jedda-l.htm (arguing that the state practice of not derogating from a provision of Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights when conducting overseas peacekeeping operations tended
to show that the provision was "inapplicable" in such cases).
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laid down such a rule; on the contrary, enemy combatants may law-
fully be slain, whatever the circumstances in which they are found. If
the Special Rapporteur is right, however, IHRL would apparently for-
bid the United States to kill even Osama bin Laden while he was
asleep or at breakfast, if by some undefined standard there were a
chance of capturing him alive.170
The United States might well prefer to capture high-value al Qaeda
targets alive, rather than killing them.171 For one thing, such captives
could yield intelligence information of extraordinary importance; for
another, their being simply held captive rather than killed would pre-
vent them from being considered "martyrs"; for a third, if they were
killed rather than captured, doubts might arise whether the United
States had identified them correctly.1 72 Furthermore, given the risk
that innocent non-combatants may be targeted by mistake or killed as
an unintended effect of a strike, the policy of capturing rather than
killing plainly has a great deal to be said in its favor. But in the re-
mote regions of Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan, where high-value
al Qaeda targets are likely to be found, capturing rather than killing
may well be a practical impossibility. The circumstances of combat
may force a choice between the alternatives of killing these targets
during a very brief window of opportunity or letting them escape. In
our view, it is nothing less than a perversion of IHRL to fault the
United States for choosing, in those circumstances, to kill them.
V. CONCLUSION
Fundamental to both the LOAC and IHRL is the regulation and
restraint of state violence. In the case of the LOAC, the law seeks to
abate the violence and hardship of armed conflict and to prevent un-
necessary suffering, even on the part of the combatants. In the case of
IHRL, the law seeks to prevent violence, injustice, and oppression on
the part of a state, especially when inflicted upon those who are under
its domination and control.
170. Cf Doswald-Beck, supra note 144, at 886 (claiming that IHRL precludes targeting a
person who is "not [actively] dangerous").
171. On the other hand, demonstrated success in killing targeted terrorist leaders might rein-
force the belief among terrorists in the United States' "intelligence dominance" (as it is said to
have done with Israel's), and thus deter future terrorist acts. See Shmuel Bar, Deterring Ter-
rorists: What Israel Has Learned, 149 POL'Y REv. 29, 34 (2008).
172. Despite the merits, from an intelligence-gathering perspective alone, of capturing such
terrorists rather than killing them in missile strikes, it appears that the Obama Administration
prefers the latter course. See Marc A. Thiessen, Dead Terrorists Tell No Tales: Is Barack Obama
Killing Too Many Bad Guys Before the US Can Interrogate Them?, FOREIMN POL'Y, Feb. 8, 2010,
available at http://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2O10/02/08/dead terroriststell__notales.
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But the state is not the only source of violence. As political theo-
rists have often reminded us, the state exists primarily to prevent the
violence and depredation at the hands of foreign enemies and local
criminals that would arise in its absence. Consequently, even con-
straints on state violence must have their limits, or the state would be
unable to perform its indispensable protective functions. Both bodies
of law reflect what the French thinker Jacques Ellul has called "the
order of necessity" under which humanity lives.173
The LOAC and IHRL differ essentially in the nature of the consid-
erations that they recognize as counterweights to the interest in re-
stricting state violence. As a general matter, the LOAC represents an
effort to achieve a realistic and sustainable balance between the coun-
tervailing imperatives of "military necessity" and the humanitarian
imperatives of avoiding or mitigating the hardships, suffering, and
death caused by armed conflict. 174 By contrast, IHRL seeks to equili-
brate the state's need to provide security against crime, maintain pub-
lic order, and administer legal justice to the individual's interests in
life, liberty, and property.
The chief error committed by those who seek to merge the LOAC
into IHRL is the collapse of the balance that the LOAC seeks to
achieve into the different kind of balance whose attainment is IHRL's
chief objective. As Professor Doswald-Beck succinctly puts it,
"[H]uman rights law does not make a distinction between armed con-
flict and peace. 1 75 In consequence of that error, the proponents of
this idea minimize the extent to which the state may deploy violence
as a matter of "military necessity," and maximize the extent to which
the state must undertake precautionary legal process before commit-
ting such violence. The conditions of armed conflict-especially, of
course, when the life of the nation is at stake-permit and indeed re-
quire the state to practice violence on a scale, of a lethality, and with
an intentionality that make it wholly different from the violence that
the state may inflict when performing its common policing func-
tions. 176 The failure to acknowledge this fact condemns to futility the
project of assimilating the LOAC into IHRL.
173. JACQUES ELLUL, VIOLENCE: REFLECrIONS FROM A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 127-28
(1969).
174. See Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel, supra note 7, 22 (surveying judicial and
scholarly materials); see also Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, supra note 39, at
201 ("From 1868, in the St. Petersburg Declaration on Small Projectiles, the accommodation of
military necessities and the requirements of humanity has been the principal objective in interna-
tional incidents relating to conduct in warfare.").
175. Doswald-Beck, supra note 144, at 886.
176. See Shany, supra note 39, text accompanying n.78, arguing that the LOAC
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The extension of IHRL to armed conflict has also set human rights
doctrine on a collision course with itself. On the one hand, there is an
emerging IHRL-based doctrine of jus ad bellum, called "humanitarian
intervention." Under this doctrine, states may or must intervene in
the internal affairs of other countries-with or without authorization
from the UN Security Council-in order to correct and prevent
human rights abuses within those countries.177 The doctrine of hu-
manitarian intervention underlaid Western involvement in several re-
cent armed conflicts, including those in Kosovo (1999) and Somalia
(1992), and it played some part-if only an incidental or post hoc
one-in the Iraq War (2003). On the other hand, we have seen
throughout this Article that there is an emerging IHRL-based jus in
bello that would, for instance, make the lethal targeting of enemy
combatants far more problematic than it is under the ordinary rules of
the law of war. To put the matter starkly, then, the conflict between
the two emerging branches of IHRL is this: on the one hand, it drives
nations into wars to vindicate human rights; on the other hand, it
makes it harder to fight and win those wars.
This conflict has the potential to influence operational decisions.
Consider NATO's decision to wage a human rights-based war against
Serbia in 1999 chiefly by means of high-altitude bombing.178 That de-
cision was made because NATO's political leaders believed that their
electorates would not tolerate the heavy casualties that would likely
be incurred from a land war in the Balkans. Moreover, the same de-
sire to avoid casualties led them to order their aviators to attack Ser-
bia at altitudes that generally put them out of range of Serbian anti-
aircraft defenses. But this very method of warfare may have posed
greater hazards to Serbia's civilian population, thus creating the risk
of violating human rights norms (assuming their applicabil-
ity). Indeed, "the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia seriously considered prosecuting U.S. leaders for NATO
governs situations of massive violence employed by collectives, often under conditions
of considerable uncertainty (i.e., "the fog of war") and resource constraints. In such a
factual circumstance, it is difficult, if not impossible, to engage in the same rigorous
right-based analysis that human rights law requires at times of peace.
177. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and
Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. J. I rN'L L. 57, 80-84 (2007) (arguing that the ICJ's
2007 decision in Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro) establishes a binding
"duty to prevent" genocide on potential interveners).
178. For discussion, see Ivo H. DAALDER & MICHAEL O'HANLON, WINNING UGLY: NATO's
WAR TO SAVE Kosovo 122-23, 221-25 (2000).
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peace operations against Slobodan Milosevic in 1999." 179 Thus, the
use of IHRL as the governing legal discourse for all aspects of war-
both jus ad bellum and jus in bello-threatens to lapse into
incoherence.
Finally, the extension of IHRL to armed conflict may have signifi-
cant consequences for the success of international law in advancing
global welfare. Rules of the LOAC represent the delicate balancing
between the imperatives of combat and the humanitarian goals in
wartime. The LOAC has been remarkably successful in achieving
compliance from warring nations in obeying these rules. This is most
likely due to the reciprocal nature of the obligations involved. Na-
tions treat prisoners of war well in order to guarantee that their own
captive soldiers will be treated well by the enemy; nations will refrain
from using weapons of mass destruction because they are deterred by
their enemy's possession of the same weapons. It has been one of the
triumphs of international law to increase the restrictions on the use of
unnecessarily destructive and cruel weapons, and to advance the
norms of distinction and the humane treatment of combatants and ci-
vilians in wartime.
IHRL norms, on the other hand, may suffer from much lower rates
of compliance. This may be due, in part, to the non-reciprocal nature
of the obligations. One nation's refusal to observe freedom of speech,
for example, will not cause another country to respond by depriving
its own citizens of their rights. If IHRL norms-which were devel-
oped without much, if any, consideration of the imperatives of com-
bat-merge into the LOAC, it will be likely that compliance with
international law will decline. If nations must balance their security
179. Osiel, supra note 2, at 188-89. On the other hand, some "human rights" advocates seem
to have little sympathy for the sufferings that NATO's bombardment inflicted on Serbian non-
combatants. The British human rights author and activist Geoffrey Robertson writes,
[I]s it not.., legitimate to undermine the morale and disrupt the comfort of "innocent"
civilians who are guilty of supporting-indeed, electing-a government which crimi-
nally persecutes minorities? ... Most of Serbia's eight million citizens were guilty of
indifference towards atrocities in Kosovo. The only answer that can be given.., is that
"punishing the people" can be justified if those people have real power to remove the
rulers for whose decisions they are to be punished .... [Serbia was] a country where,
despite a courageous opposition, the majority of the public supported Milosevic and his
commanders throughout the Kosovo events albeit without full knowledge (although
they could have found out) about the brutality with which they implemented their pop-
ular plan for ethnic cleansing.
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE
483-84 (3d ed. 2006). If Robertson's views were accepted, then concern for the enforcement of
human rights norms would override the basic distinction between civilians and combatants. We
invite the reader to reflect on which position-Robertson's "human rights" stance or the
LOAC's traditional protection for noncombatants-is the more humane.
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needs against ever more restrictive and out-of-place international
rules supplied by IHRL, we hazard to guess that the latter will give
way. Rather than attempt to superimpose rules for peacetime civilian
affairs on the unique circumstances of the "war on terror," a better
strategy for encouraging compliance with international law would be
to adapt the legal system already specifically designed for armed
conflict.
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